Tag: IPC

-Report by Annette Abraham

In a curious turn of events, the Bombay High Court on Friday granted a reduced sentence to the accused in the Sitaram Dada Sarode v. State of Maharashtra case on the grounds of an inconsistent timeline and the occurrence of grave provocation. The accused, an ayurvedic medic, had been convicted of murdering his wife, Sangita Sarode, a pharmacist.

FACTS

The accused married Sangita in 1993. Though they initially lived in Manmad together, Sangita and their children moved to Pune as she secured a job as a pharmacist in the city. Mr. Sitaram would visit his wife and children around once every fortnight. The incident occurred on the evening of 30th August 2008 on one such visit to Pune. Sangita and her children lived at the residence of her mother Shantabai. Here, a supposed quarrel between the accused and his wife resulted in her sustaining a head injury as well as multiple burn wounds.

Sangita was rushed to the hospital where Dr. Govind Kamble recorded Sangita’s statement wherein she stated that Sitaram questioned her fidelity and in rage, hit her on the back of the head and poured a burning substance over her before fleeing the scene. On the basis of this statement, her mother filed a complaint and Sitaram was arrested on 30th August 2008 under Sections 307, 498-A and 504. A second dying declaration was collected by the Head Constable in the evening that day that stated the same.

Sangita succumbed to her injuries six days after the incident on 5th September 2008 and her body was sent for an autopsy. Dr. Ajay Taware conducted the autopsy, concluding that Sangita had sustained 40% burn injuries, the primary cause of death, in addition to a haematoma in her scalp and a sub-arachnoid haemorrhage in her brain. Charges against Sitaram were filed under Sections 302, 498-A and 504, however, the accused denied all of them, pleading not guilty. The defence pleaded in the Sessions Court that:

a. The burn wounds sustained by Sangita were caused not due to acid but by fire. On the day of the incident because of the Pola festival, Sangita was preparing food and the over-flaming of the stove caused her injuries.

b. The accused did not have cordial relationships with Shantabai and his brother-in-law Bajirao Masal, who was also present on the day of the incident, and hence they had falsely implicated him and enticed Sitaram’s son to testify against him as well. The Additional Sessions Court found Sitaram to be guilty and sentenced him to life imprisonment and imposed a fine of ₹1000/- for the crimes of murder as well as cruelty.

Appellant’s Argument

Mr. Sitaram and his counsel Mr. Pawan Mali raised the matter before the High Court of Bombay requesting the honourable bench to review the legality of the order passed in the sessions court.
The Appellant’s contentions were as follows:

1. Discrepancies in the Timeline Presented –
   The main contention with the timelines lay in the statements collected from Sangita. In the first dying declaration recorded by Dr. Govind Kamble at 6:30 p.m., Sangita’s right leg thumb impression is taken as a signature owing to the fact that both her hands were severely burnt. However, this statement was only signed at 9:30 p.m., 3 hours after it was collected. Even more curiously, in the statement collected by the Head Constable of Police around 9:30 p.m, Sangita’s signature was given as validation. This is a clear contradiction to the circumstances of the first declaration recorded earlier in the day. Hence, the second declaration must be considered void.
2. Incomplete Evidence –
   The combined case papers of Sangita that detailed her treatment in the 6 days preceding her death revealed that she had been treated with Silver sulphate. Further, Dr. Pandit and Dr. Shinde, who administered her immediate treatment, noted that she sustained approximately 45% of burns that seemed to be largely flame burns. Dr. Shinde
   and Dr. Pandit, as well as Dr. Sarala Gandhi who administered anaesthesia to Sangit had not been examined by the prosecution.
3. Provocation –
   From the statements of the main witnesses, it is discernible that constant quarrels used to occur between the married couple and that these often resulted in physical violence.

The appellant, calling upon the case of Dauvaram Nirmalkar v. State of Chhattisgarh, contended that the constant and unceasing nature of the altercations that occurred over the course of their marriage caused mental turmoil to Sitaram. It was stated that this falls under the ambit of Exception I of Section 300 of the IPC which granted that continuous provocation or torment can be considered equivalent to a singular grave provocation. Under this provision, Sangita’s death would amount not to murder but to culpable homicide.

Court’s Decision

The Bombay High Court came to the conclusion that though the accused was responsible for Sangita’s death, the constant provocation caused the accused to temporarily lose the sense of right and wrong and commit the offence and that the murder was not premeditated or planned. Hence, it falls under the ambit of section 304 of the IPC, culpable homicide not amounting to murder.

As such, the honourable court ruled that a life sentence was too hefty a punishment and the judgement of the Sessions Court was overruled. Sitaram’s sentence was reduced to 10 years a fine of ₹50,000/- was imposed. Since Sitaram had already served 14 years under imprisonment between 2008 and 2022, the court ordered that he be released forthwith.

-Report by Nidhi Jha

It was in a recent case of RAMESH LASHA PALVA AND ANR Vs THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA, the Bombay High Court held that sharing common intention with the prime offenders is a vital factor for the accused to be convicted for that particular offence. Bombay High Court also clarified that for invoking Exception 4 under Section 300 IPC there are certain conditions that need to be fulfilled.

FACTS

On 12th November 2014, 2nd Additional Sessions Judge, Thane convicted both Ramesh Lasha Palva and Kashinath Lasha Palva under Section 302 read with 34 of IPC with imprisonment for life and also imposed a fine of Rs 1,000/- each for the murder of Lahanu Jivya Palva (deceased).

There was enmity between the Appellants and the deceased pertaining to the landed property because of which fights happened between them on various occasions. On 3rd November 2010 at around 1:00 am Appellant 1 i.e Ramesh Palva called Lahanu Jivya Palva (deceased). After some time when Lahanu went towards him, Appellant 2 i.e Kashinath Lasha Palva came from behind and hit Lahanu with a ‘musal’ (wooden pestle) and ran away. After getting treated at various hospitals Lahanu Jivya Palva was declared dead on 14th November 2010 while undergoing treatment at Sudarshan Hospital.

APPELLANT’S CONTENTION

The Appellant’s advocate submitted that On 3rd November 2010, Ramesh had filed N.C Complaint against Lahanu and 2 others stating that Lahanu (deceased) was abusing the sister of the Appellants in presence of Dinesh (PW-5) and Jitendra (PW-7). Jitendra (PW-7), Dinesh (PW-5) and Lahanu (deceased) were beating Ramesh. Lahanu was under the influence of liquor and fell down from the raised platform in a gutter and sustained an injury to his head. She submitted that because Lahanu was already having a dispute over property with the Appellants, they registered the present crime against the Appellants.

It was submitted by the Appellant’s advocate that the Act of Appellant No. 2 falls under Exception 4 of Section 300 and so the conviction of both the appellant under Section 302 of I.P.C is not appropriate.

DEFENDANT’S CONTENTION

There were three eyewitnesses to the incident that took place on 3rd November 2010. Bharati, the wife of the deceased said that due to the previous enmity, Appellant No.1 called her husband and when Lahanu approached him, Appellant No.2 came from behind and hit him with the ‘ musal’ and he ran away. She clearly stated that Appellant No.1 did nothing in the entire incident.

COURT’S DECISION

The court observed that the wife of the deceased categorically stated and also evidence indicated that, Appellant No.1 did nothing to the deceased hence he didn’t share the same intention of assaulting the deceased with Appellant No. 2.

Evidence also indicated that the intention of Appellant No. 2 was not to murder Lahanu neither he took any undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner. Also, there was no evidence proving that Appellant No.2 has come to the defendant’s place with the wooden pestle ( musal) with the intention of murdering as that tool is available commonly in every household for the purpose of pounding and grinding.

The act of the Appellant therefore according to the Court falls under the purview of Exception 4 of Section 300 of IPC and as he had no intention to commit the murder of Lahanu, Section 304 (Part II) of IPC would be attracted. Therefore Ramesh is acquitted of the charges framed against him by giving him the benefit of doubt and Appellant No.2 Kashinath is acquitted of charges of murder and convicted under Section 304 (Part II) of IPC, and he is sentenced to suffer R.I. for 10 years and to pay a fine of Rs.25,000/-; in default of payment of fine to further suffer R.I. for 1 year. And as Appellant No.2 Kashinath Lasha Palva is in jail since 12th November 2010 and has completed his sentence of 10 years, so he also has been acquitted from jail immediately.

-Report by Nandani Soni

It was held by the Supreme Court of India that the order passed by the High court convicting the accused must be quashed and the appellants must be acquitted.

FACTS

An appeal had been registered against the order passed by the division bench of the High Court. The appellants namely, Chaitu Gowala and Ajay Ahari were tried for the offences under sections, 392/149/302/148/323 IPC for having murdered the Managing director of the company in which they were working, named Rupak Kumar Gogoi. Eyewitnesses were examined by the prosecution, who had identified the appellants and the other accused. After the trial, the trial court acquitted 57 of the accused and convicted 13 of them. The present appeal only remained for Chaitu Gowala and Ajay Ahari.

APPELLANT’S CONTENTION

The learned counsel who appeared on behalf of the accused stated that the appellants were merely office bearers at that time and the labourers gathered while they were talking and attacked. They further submitted that there was no evidence to prove that the appellants had in fact committed the offence, hence the conviction of the accused becomes baseless.

RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION

The eye witnesses saw the appellants engaging with the mob and talking to them in their language. Therefore, the appellants were rightly convicted under Section 149 of IPC.

COURT’S DECISION

The court observed that the prosecution failed to gather any concrete evidence for the offences, it was proved that the appellants were merely office bearers at that time and there was hardly any evidence that the appellants even instigated the mob. It was observed:

“If the entire evidence and the deposition of the eye witnesses are scanned, it appears that in fact the appellants were present there as office bearers of the Union. There were some disputes with respect to wages. Even as per the deposition of PW3, on being called, the appellants entered into the office room but soon both of them came out and told the assembled labourers that the Managing Director would distribute their dues and asked them to go to the place where dues were to be distributed. Despite the same, the labourers protested that they would not accept anything other than the full dues and they started shouting…….. in absence of any concrete evidence that the appellants attacked and/or caused any injury to the deceased and/or even the PSO and in absence of any evidence what was uttered by the appellants – accused in their own language and in absence of any evidence that the appellants instigated the labourers – others co-accused, we are of the opinion that the appellants cannot be convicted for the offence under Section 302 IPC with the aid of Section 149 IPC.”

Therefore, the decisions of the High court and the Trial Court were set aside as far as the appellants were concerned and the punishment for the other accused was confirmed.

-Report by Ayushi Dixit

The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case Munna Prasad Verma v. State of U.P. & Anr. quashed and set aside the criminal proceedings against the appellants and stated that it is an abuse of the process of law.

The facts of the case are that Brijendra Nath Mishra obtained B.Ed. degree from an affiliated college of Gorakhpur University, Madan Mohan Malviya College, Deoria. After the death of his father, he called for a compassionate appointment and based on his education record he was eligible and hence was selected by the Selection Committee
(appellants). Brijendra Nath Mishra was selected by the committee on the compassionate ground under the dying harness rules.

The complainant (respondent) lodged FIR under sections 419, 420, 467,471 IPC against the selection committee and Brijendra Nath Mishra, who according to the complainant, has presented a forged marksheet of B.Ed. for compassionate appointment and the committee members conspired for the appointment and they were aware of the fact that the documents are forged.

After the complaint was filed, an investigation began and a final report was filed by the police but the Magistrate further gave directions for investigation. When the third round of investigation was completed a final report was filed again. On the request of the complainant, the investigating officer was changed and then finally a chargesheet was filed incriminating the appellants (member of the selection committee) and other persons for offences under section 419, 420, 467,468, 471 and 120-B IPC, cognizance was taken by the learned magistrate by an order.

The order was challenged by the appellants by filing a petition for quashing the cognizance against them under section 482 CrPC. The other two members of the selection committee against whom cognizance was taken have
preferred for a special leave petition before the court but during the pendency of the proceedings, unfortunately, both died and the court by a separate order dismissed their proceeding. The case Concerning with forged documents presented by Brijendra Nath Mishra for seeking a compassionate appointment is facing trial and that would be dealt according to the procedure established by law.

As far as the matter related to assistance by the selection committee, as the complainant has alleged, no prima facie evidence has been found which incriminates the appellants and shows that the appellants helped in fabricating or creating the forged document. The present members of the Selection Committee who relied on the documents without verification believed them to be genuine and recommended for the compassionate appointment which does
not mean that they helped in the fabrication of documents or were aware of the forged document. Thus, the members of the committee are not in any manner involved in the case.

“The learned Magistrate has taken cognizance and issued summons against them by an Order dated 4th August 2009 in the instant proceedings, which, in our view, would be nothing but a clear abuse of the process of law. Thus, the appeals stand allowed and the criminal proceedings arising from Case Crime No. 128 of 2002 qua the appellants are quashed and set aside.”

The appeals are set aside but the proceeding by the learned Magistrate against Brijendra Nath Mishra will continue in accordance with law and the court also held that if there is any pending applications regarding the case it shall also be disposed of.

-Report by Anas Ali

In the case of The State of Madhya Pradesh versus Nandu @ Nandua, The Supreme Court ruled that if an accused person is found guilty of the offence covered by Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), no penalty or punishment may be less than life imprisonment.

FACTS

The Appellant; the State of Madhya Pradesh filed an appeal against the order of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh. The High Court had reduced the sentence of the accused to what he had already undergone. The accused had been sentenced to life imprisonment when he was convicted for the offences under Sections 147, 148, 323 and 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC).

APPELLANT’S CONTENTION

It was argued by the appellants that the punishment that could be imposed would be death or imprisonment for life and also a fine, however, it shall not be less than imprisonment for life. Any punishment or sentence that is less than life imprisonment would violate Section 302 of the IPC.

COURT’S DECISION

The Supreme Court has entertained the appeal of the state. The Court gave a decision in the favour of the state and set aside the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court. It was observed

“The punishment for murder under Section 302 IPC shall be death or imprisonment for life and fine. Therefore, the
minimum sentence provided for the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC would be imprisonment for life and fine. There cannot be any sentence/punishment less than imprisonment for life, if an accused is convicted for the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC. Any punishment less than the imprisonment for life for the offence punishable under Section 302 would be contrary to Section 302 IPC.”

The decision of the trial court was restored and the accused was sentenced to life imprisonment.

-Report by Rhea Mistry

In Kamal Khudal v. the State of Assam, the supreme court stated that conviction can depend upon a dying declaration after corroborating and checking whether the said dying declaration is true. Even if the dying declaration is not corroborated, the court can move forward with the decision relying on it without any further verification.

Kamal Khudal is a convict, appellant herein, and has appealed to the supreme court to dismiss his punishment. Kamal Khudal and two others were accused of the murder of the deceased, Uttam Datta, and charged with an offense punishable under section 302 read with section 34 of the IPC.

In the judgment dated 10.06.2010, the two accused, Munna Bhoi and Kamal Khudal were charged with life imprisonment with a fine of Rs. 2000/- each, and if there is a default in payment of the fine, further punishment of rigorous imprisonment for a period of two months. Bipin Bhoi, the third co-accused was granted the benefit of the doubt and acquitted from the punishment.

In that case, on 15th July 2007 at 7 am, the co-accused, Munna Bhoi had come to receive the deceased, Uttam Datta, for paddy plantation adjacent to his liquor local shop. When the deceased had left with the co-accused, the brother of the deceased was present at home. After working in the field for some time, the deceased had tagged along with Munna Bhoi to his liquor shop where there was some commotion detected after going in shop as said by
the locals in its vicinity area.

After a few minutes of commotion, the deceased had come out with burns all over him, and this was witnessed by a local, Hanu Khetrapal. When asked about what had happened, the deceased had told him that the accused had poured hot Lali (the raw material used to make liquor) over him which caused him the burns. The deceased left and later his dead body was found in the drain of Duribam Tea Estate.

The learned counsel of the appellant asserted that the court had made an error in deciding the case. He stated that the judge considered the dying declaration without any corroboration and verification, and said the case is “reliable in legal evidence”. Arguing that as per the rule of prudence, the learned counsel stated the court should rely upon corroboration before relying on the dying declaration. The presence of the brother of the deceased, while the deceased went along with the accused, does not prove anything and cannot be considered as last seen together.

According to the medical reports of the postpartum of the deceased done by Dr. Nirmal Chutia, he examined that the deceased had healthy organs, but burns all over his body. His body has 75% of burns which caused multiple dark ecchymosis on his skin. Ecchymosis means discoloring of the skin resulting from blood underneath. He certified that the marks and injuries were caused after the death of the deceased and that the cause of death was shock and hemorrhage resulting from chest & skull injuries and skull injuries, including that on the thorax, multiple injuries had been detected.

The Supreme Court stated that the High Court decided the case accepting the dying declaration. The court said

“The law regarding the nature, scope, and value as a piece of evidence of oral and written dying declarations is now fairly well settled by various judicial decisions of this Court. A dying declaration, oral or written, before it could be relied upon, must pass a test of reliability as it is a statement made in the absence of the accused and there is no opportunity for the accused even to put it through the fire of cross-examination to test is genuine or veracity. The court has, therefore, subjected it to close scrutiny. But once the court is satisfied that it is a truthful version as to the circumstances in which the death resulted and the persons causing injuries, the law does not expect that there should be corroboration before it can be relied upon. However, if there are infirmities and the court does not find it safe to base any conclusion on it without some further evidence to support it, the question of corroboration arises.”

The maxim “Nemo moriturus praesumitur mentire” is put to use here which means that a person does not go to his creator with a lie in his mouth. The court believes that when a man is on the brink of death, the person will not lie.

The SC also stated that the appellant was arrested on 23rd July 2007 when he was supposed to be arrested on the 15th of July 2007. And that the appellant has not revealed what or where he was from the 15th of July to the 23rd of July. This proves that he was absconding. The Supreme court dismissed this appeal stating that there is no reason for them to interfere in the appeal and the judgment made by the High Court stands by.

–Report by Ishika Sehgal

The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and life sentences of four people in the case of MOHAMMAD IRFAN VERSUS STATE OF KARNATAKA for conspiring a terrorist attack in Bengaluru’s Indian Institute of Science in December 2005.

FACTS OF THE CASE

There was a shootout at the Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore in 2005, which was being investigated. During this investigation, a larger conspiracy concerning Lasker-e-Toiba(LeT), a banned organization in India was revealed. After carrying out the full investigation, eight persons were arrayed as accused. Accused no.8 or A-8 was shown to be absconding. A trial was held for A-1 to A-7. In 2011, the trial court acquitted A-7 but found A-1 to A-6 guilty and passed an order under the Indian Penal Code,1860; Explosive Substances Act,1908; Arms Act, 1959 and Unlawful activities prevention Act, 1967.

Four appeals were filed before the Hon’ble High Court of Karnataka by A-1, A-2, A-4, A-5 and A-6. A separate appeal was filed by A-3. The state also filed an appeal against the acquittal of A-7. The High Court upheld the imprisonment under section 121A for A-1, A-3, A-4, A-5 and A-6. A-2 was given 8 years of imprisonment under section 5 of the explosives arms act while the order of acquittal of A-7 was upheld.

Being aggrieved by the decision of the High Court, a special leave petition was filed by A-1, A-4, A-5 and A-6. No appeals had been preferred by A-2 and A-3. The state had also not filed any appeal.

CONTENTIONS OF THE APPELLANT

It was contended that the charges under Sections 121 and 153A of the IPC had not been established, leaving only the charge under Section 121A of the IPC, which was also without merit. There was no justification for the High Court to extend the sentence to life imprisonment in a charge where 7 years of imprisonment were sufficient. According to the accused, the circumstances in the record did not support such an exercise. Further, it was stated that the recovery of the books and explosive substances is insufficient for sustaining a charge under section 121A of the IPC. It was contended that the sentence entered into the record did not meet the requirements of Section 196 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which asked for a sanction from the competent authority for the prosecution of an accused for an offense punishable, among other things, under Chapter VI of the IPC.

CONTENTION OF THE STATE/ RESPONDENTS

The state contended that the material on record which was recovered during the investigation such as a diary, books, minutes of meetings attended by the accused, and the explosives are enough to put the matter against the accused beyond a reasonable doubt. The documents are signed by all the accused and have been verified by a handwriting expert. The diary and the books clearly mention their intent. The sanction had been obtained for the prosecution of the accused under section 196 by a competent authority and considering the number of explosives recovered, the enhancement of punishment was required.

SUPREME COURT’S DECISION

The court read the judgments delivered by the lower courts in detail and also considered the evidence of record and held that the accused are guilty. It held that the question of obtaining sanction under section 196 does not arise as it had been obtained by Undersecretary after discussion with the Home Minister and the Chief Minister.

The court further observed that though the witnesses turned hostile, some evidence can be deduced from the testimony which cannot be rejected like some of the accused being members of the trust and going for meetings. Further, the court observed:

“……The recoveries of books and literature were completely supported by the concerned Panch witnesses and the Panchanamas on record. The books and literature did carry inflammatory content and messages. The translations of the original versions in Urdu were placed on record by the Prosecution. The voluntary statements which led to such recoveries and the recoveries themselves were also proved by the Prosecution. One important piece of material recovered from A-2 was Diary Exh.P-92. The tenor and text of the contents were captured quite correctly by the trial court in its judgment as referred to hereinabove. The signatures of the concerned accused were proved beyond any doubt through the evidence of PW67, handwriting expert. It thus stood established that the Accused had assembled together with the intent as disclosed from the minutes of the meetings of the Trust. The explosive substances, details of which are given hereinabove were recovered from A-2, A-3, A-4 and A-6. Voluntary statements of said Accused and consequential recoveries effected through Panchas were also duly proved by the Prosecution.

The court relied on a number of judgments to reach the decision. Relying on the observations of Navjot Sandhu, Mir Hasan Khan vs State, Nazir Khan, etc, the court held that from the language of section 121A, persons who plan to “overawe” the central or state government by use of criminal force will be guilty. From all the evidence the intent of conspiracy was clear and it is not necessary that an illegal commission or omission must take place to be punished under section 121A.

The court emphasized that, if the conspiracy, in this case, had been carried out, it would have caused significant harm to public safety and the lives and safety of the people, therefore enhancement of the sentence to life imprisonment was necessary. Such conspiracies shall be dealt with strictly. All the appeals were dismissed as they were devoid of any merit.

-Report by Nistha Tiwari

In the case of Aman Kumar Bharadwaj v. state of Himachal Pradesh and Ors. the High Court of Himachal Pradesh quashed the criminal case filed against a journalist who was checking the system of generating e-pass during COVID-19.

The Zee Media House Journalist Abhishek Kumar Bharadwaj was booked under sections 419 (cheating by personation), 468(forgery for purpose of cheating ), and 471 (using as genuine a forged document or electronic record ) of the Indian Penal Code. He was also booed under section 66(D) of the information and technology Act, 2000 and section 54 of the Disaster Management Act, 2005.

The state of Himachal Pradesh, on 25th April 2021, issued certain directions regarding the inter-state movement to Himanchal Pradesh. This was to be monitored through the process of registration of an e-pass on the e-pass web portal. On having doubts about the increased movement in the state even after strict restrictions, the petitioner being a responsible journalist decided to investigate and check the system of generating e-passes. The petitioner filled out two online registration forms for the issuance of two e-passes for entering the state of Himachal Pradesh without mentioning any valid reason. These two e – passes were registered in the names of two renowned personalities
i.e., Amitabh Bachchan and Donald Trump. He uploaded random vehicle details and his own Aadhar card details while doing so. Even after filling incorrect details, the passes were issued to him which assured him that the details are not being verified and the authorities are issuing passes in a mechanical manner.

The investigation was carried out by him with the permission of the Bureau Chief. Upon completion of the investigation, the journalist brought it to the notice of the senior authorities of the state including a cabinet minister and Director General of Police of Himachal Pradesh. However, he received no response and telecasted it on the news channel.

An FIR was registered against Aman Bharadwaj by the state as he used fake registration numbers of vehicles by mentioning his own mobile number and Aadhar card number as Identity proof for generating fake and forged documents. It was also alleged he caused the spread of false propaganda about the state allowing the entry of anyone and everyone in the state, as the state had put barriers and was checking the entry of each car.

The court observed the ingredients of the offenses under which the FIR was filed and came to the conclusion that the acts of Aman Bhardwaj do not fall within the definition of the alleged offenses.

“…Petitioner was having doubt about proper working of verification system of State at the time of registration of online request for e-pass and generation of e-passes. He was not having any other via-media to check and verify the system except submitting a misleading request. It is evident that in entire episode intention of petitioner was neither dishonest nor fraudulent as immediately after generation of epasses, which otherwise could not have been used by any person,
petitioner brought it to the notice of concerned authorities and persons…”

Aman Bharadwaj was neither fraudulent nor dishonest as after the issuance of e-passes based on the fake documents, he brought it to the concerned authorities. He never intended to use those passes for entering Himachal Pradesh. There is no sufficient material for registration of the offenses and a prima facie case cannot be made against the petitioner. In light of the above, the petition was allowed and the FIR was quashed.

-Report by Avinash Pandey

The Karnataka High Court observed in Sri Shivaswamy vs The State Of Karnataka the importance of possession of the property to allege trespass. In this case, the respondent had filed a complaint against the petitioner alleging that he had trespassed into her property, threatened the tenants to vacate, and also caused some loss by disconnecting electricity. Furthermore, the petitioner had trespassed on multiple properties in that area. On the above-stated contentions, the complainant was filed under sections 143, 149, 427, 447, 448, and 506 of the Indian Penal Code.

The petitioners had filed this petition to quash the proceedings of the complaint. The counsel from the side of the petitioners contested that, the case is not criminal in nature but is inclined more towards civil originality. It was further stated that the petitioners are trying to arm-twist the case as they had lost all the papers and prior litigations for the property in contention. Furthermore, the complaint was registered after a delay of 7 months. The delay in the filing shows that the complaint was filed with mala fide intention. The respondents on the other hand refuted the contentions and claimed that they had possession of the property.

The Single judge bench comprising Justice M Nagaprasanna made the initial observation that the land, in this case, was purchased duly by the Bangalore Development Authority to make the rightful use for the NTI Housing Co-operative Society. The petitioner purchased the property from the society with a registered sale deed and all the petitioners have purchased their portions via a registered sale deed. After some time had purchased the property with all the paperwork and the revenue records replaced with their names. The complainants had challenged the acquisition in a different case before the Karnataka High court wherein it was held that the petitioners hold the possession of the property and the claim of the complainants have no merit.

The court made the observation that for a case to be made under section 447 the possession should be there. Section 447 read with section 441 of the IPC is an “interplay between a civil right and a crime”. The respondents had also contended that the petition has been filed 3 years after the complaint and hence should be rejected on account of the delay, to which the court replied that it has power under section 482 of the CrPC to allow a petition despite a delay for prevention of miscarriage of justice. The case relied upon by the respondents were also held to be irrelevant.

In the current case, it was seen that the documents provided by the petitioner party were enough for the court to acknowledge their stand and to overpower the documents presented by the respondents. It was observed:

“…The case at hand is for offence under Section 447 of the IPC, for which the most relevant factor would be exclusive possession of the property, on which the accused is alleged to have trespassed. If exclusive possession is not with the complainant, the complaint of criminal trespass into the property and damage to that property under Section 427 of the IPC can hardly be alleged, as observed hereinabove.”

In the judgment the court allowed the Petition to prevent the miscarriage of justice and quashed the criminal complaint against them.

–Report by Rhea Mistry

In the case of Monika Sharma v. Mukesh Bhagal, the court disposed of the appeal for annulment of the marriage of Monika Sharma due to the bar of limitation.

The appellant is a graduate of Master of Science from Singhania University in Rajasthan and is not known the age, education, and occupation of the respondent. She is an officer at the Union Bank of India in Mumbai. The appellant and respondent, both are Hindus. Monika Sharma, the appellant knew the respondent since the year 2000.

In the appeal, the appellant asserted that in the year 2003 when she was pursuing her 10th-grade studies and was of 14-15 years of age, the respondent made his first physical contact under duress with her and clicked obscene photographs. The respondent had threatened her he would leak her obscene photographs if she told anyone about his actions. Monika was suffering silently as she comes from a very religious family in the State of Haryana where the Khap Panchayat is practiced.

This continued till 2008 when she moved to pursue her higher studies. When the appellant returned in 2010, the respondent threatened to defame her and her family and disfigure her by throwing acid on her if she didn’t marry him.

In 2011, when the appellant was working as a teacher at a Coaching Centre, the respondent slapped her in front of everyone just because the appellant had refused to go out with him. The appellant had secured a job as a single-window operator at a branch of Punjab National Bank located in the village Dhanora and was staying in a PG. The respondent constantly pressurized her for marrying him taking the advantage of her situation.

On December 28th, 2011, the respondent called the appellant to come out of her office, or else he would create a fiasco there. On going out of the office the respondent took the appellant’s phone, pulled her into the car, and gave a prasad to eat. The prasad was spiked and the appellant wasn’t aware of it, but, later, realized it. After eating the spiked prasad, the appellant had become helpless and a silent observer of the events unfolding with her. She remembered that on the way the respondent picked up his friends, took her to a mandir, clicked some photos, and made her sign some blank papers. And on the next day, 29th December 2011, the respondent dropped her at her office. The respondent had threatened her not to reveal the incidents or else he would harm her and her family.

In March 2012, the appellant shifted to Mumbai as she got the opportunity to work at Union Bank of India, the respondent followed her to Mumbai and harassed her continuously to come and live with him. When the appellant refused all his proposals, he again threatened to leak her photographs. In April 2012, the respondent left Mumbai after threatening the appellant that if she does not marry him, he would kill her parents in Haryana. The respondent came back to Mumbai and started extorting money from the appellant. The respondent continued his force, abuse, and harassment. His family started exerting pressure on her to marry him, so the appellant informed them about the respondent’s behavior and actions, still, the family did not pay any heed and pressured her to marry him. The appellant claimed the respondent also sexually and physically abused her once which left her mentally sick for some time.

In November 2013, gaining courage, she canceled her cards as she had given them to the respondent for use. On December 3rd, 2013, the appellant informed her parents about the incidents and the events following which the parents filed a complaint against the respondent. Upon this, the respondent filed an application for restitution of conjugal rights in the Court of Civil Judge at Bilaspur on 17th January 2014 under section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act.
This was the first time the appellant came to know that the respondent purported to be her supposed husband. The appellant had not gone forward with her complaint, but in July 2014, with her lawyer, she filed a complaint and went forward with it. A crime was registered under sections 376, 366, 354, 506 (2) of the Indian Penal Code and 9 of 25 under section 4 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 against the respondent and she had filed her statement at Bilaspur.

The court stated that the appellant was suffering since 2003 when she was of 14-15 years, and when she was of 18 years in 2007, she did not file a complaint and kept silent. After 6 years, the appellant has filed her complaint. There are just her bare words and no verification from any source, including her parents, brothers, sisters, or Union Bank of
India personnel. There is also no evidence of alleged extortion of a considerable amount by manipulating her debit card, which might have easily been obtained as electronic evidence. There is also no evidence of a medical evaluation of the appellant, who claims that the respondent sexually exploited, and subjected her to unnatural intercourse.
The court said that the overall evidence is improbable, unbelievable, and unacceptable.

The judge held that once the appellant came to know that she was forcefully taken to a mandir, the force and fraud ceased to exist. If the aforementioned truth was known on December 29, 2011, the petition might have been presented within a year. Nothing stopped her, and thus the bar under sub-section-2 of Section 12 of the Act operates in the relevant facts and circumstances.

The appeal made is without any substance and stands dismissed.