HIGH COURT OF DELHI invites online applications from eligible candidates for filling up 16 vacancies (15 existing & 01 anticipated) by way of direct recruitment in Delhi Higher Judicial Service by holding the Delhi Higher Judicial Service Examination.

Stages

Delhi Higher Judicial Service Examination will be held in three successive stages:-

  1. Delhi Higher Judicial Service Preliminary Examination (Objective type with 25% negative marking) for selection of candidates for the Mains Examination (Written); and
  2. Delhi Higher Judicial Service Mains Examination (Written) for selection of candidates for calling for Viva-Voce.
  3. Viva-Voce.

Eligibility

The qualifications for direct recruits shall be as follows:-

  1. must be a citizen of India.
  2. must have been continuously practising as an Advocate for not less than seven years as of the last date of receipt of applications, i.e., 29.07.2023.
  3. must have attained the age of 35 years and have not attained the age of 45 years on the 1st day of January of the year in which the applications for appointment are invited, i.e., on 01.01.2023.

Important Dates

Date and Time of commencement for creation of New Log In and filling Online Application Form14th July 2023
Last Date and Time for filling Online Application Form and/or making payment through Debit Card/Credit Card/Internet Banking/UPI29th July 2023
Delhi Higher Judicial Service Preliminary Examination20th August 2023 (11 AM to 1 PM)

Fees

  • General Category – Rs.2000/-
  • Scheduled Caste / Scheduled Tribe / Person with Disabilities (identified disabilities) – Rs.500/-

The candidates should pay through Debit Card//Credit Card/Internet Banking/UPI.

Application Process

The candidates shall submit their applications online only in the prescribed format through the official website of the High Court of Delhi i.e. www.delhihighcourt.nic.in.

The candidates can take a printout of the application form and keep it for future reference. They should not send the printout of the online application form to the High Court of Delhi.

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-Report by Ankit Hinnariya

In a recent ruling, the High Court of Delhi granted anticipatory bail to Faheem Ahmed and Danish Khan, the petitioners in a case registered under Sections 323/354/354B/376/34 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) at Laxmi Nagar Police Station. The judgment, delivered by Hon’ble Mr. Justice Rajnish Bhatnagar, took into account the arguments presented by both the petitioners and the State. This article provides an overview of the case, the contentions raised by the parties involved, and the court’s decision.

Facts

The case at hand involves an FIR registered at Laxmi Nagar Police Station in Delhi under Sections 323/354/354B/376/34 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC).

The FIR was lodged against Faheem Ahmed and Danish Khan, the petitioners, on the basis of allegations made by the complainant. The FIR accused the petitioners of offences including assault, molestation, and rape.

The initial PCR call made by the complainant on September 9, 2022, alleged molestation by the petitioners. The following day, another PCR call was made, claiming that the petitioners had threatened the complainant and intended to rape her along with their friends. 

Subsequently, at 2:04 PM on the same day, another PCR call reiterated these allegations.

It was only on September 26, 2022, when the written complaint was forwarded to the concerned Deputy Commissioner of Police (DCP) and Assistant Commissioner of Police (ACP), that the allegations of rape were levelled against the petitioners. Prior to this, the charges primarily revolved around molestation.

The medical examination of the complainant conducted on September 9, 2022, did not reveal any signs of rape. The observations made by the doctor from Hedgewar Hospital suggested physical assault rather than rape.

On October 19, 2022, another PCR call was made by the complainant, alleging molestation once again by the petitioners.

These facts form the basis of the case, indicating the sequence of events leading to the filing of the FIR and the subsequent allegations against the petitioners. The court took into consideration these facts while evaluating the merits of the case and deciding on the grant of anticipatory bail to the petitioners.

Petitioner’s Contention

In their petition for anticipatory bail, the petitioners, Faheem Ahmed and Danish Khan, presented several contentions to support their innocence and request protection from arrest. These contentions were put forth by their advocate, Ms. ParulAgarwal, during the court proceedings.

The petitioner argued that the allegations levelled against them in the FIR were false and frivolous. They claimed that there was an ongoing family dispute and various civil suits related to property matters, which might have prompted the filing of the FIR as an attempt to harm their reputation and grab their share of the property.

The petitioner highlighted inconsistencies in the statements of the complainant, specifically regarding the charges under Section 376 of the IPC (rape). They contended that the allegations of rape were added later, after the complainant’s statement was recorded under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.), suggesting that these additional charges were an afterthought.

The petitioners’ counsel argued that custodial interrogation of the petitioners was unnecessary. They emphasized that the petitioners were willing to cooperate with the investigation and were ready to join it whenever required by the investigating officer. The petitioner further stated that no recovery was to bemade from the petitioners, indicating that their presence in custody was not warranted.

The petitioner asserted that there were no grounds to believe that the petitioners would abscond or tamper with evidence. They assured the court that their clients had no intention of evading the law and would actively participate in the proceedings.

These contentions were presented to establish the petitioners’ innocence and argue for the grant of anticipatory bail, ensuring their protection from arrest pending the investigation.

Respondent’s Contention

The respondents, represented by Mr. Amit Ahlawat, Assistant Public Prosecutor, He was accompanied by SI Sanyukta from the Laxmi Nagar Police Station. Additionally, Mr. Ankit Mehta, Mr. Varun Singh, and Mr. Sanjay Kumar served as advocates representing the second respondent in the case, and presented their contentions opposing the grant of anticipatory bail to the petitioners, Faheem Ahmed and Danish Khan.

The prosecution argued that the allegations against the petitioners were grave and serious in nature. They emphasized the severity of the charges under Sections 323/354/354B/376/34 of the IPC. The respondents contended that considering the seriousness of the offences, the petitioners should not be granted anticipatory bail.

The respondents highlighted that the complainant had submitted a detailed complaint to the police, providing a comprehensive account of the allegations made against the petitioners. They also pointed out that the complainant’s statement under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C. further supported the charges brought against the petitioners.

The complainant opposed the grant of anticipatory bail to the petitioners. The respondents argued that the complainant’s objection was based on the serious nature of the allegations and the need for a thorough investigation into the matter.

While the respondents focused on the gravity of the charges and the complainant’s detailed complaint, they did not contest the petitioners’ contention that custodial interrogation was unnecessary or that no recovery was to be made from the petitioners. Instead, their primary contention revolved around the seriousness of the allegations and the complainant’s opposition to the grant of anticipatory bail.

JUDGMENT 

Justice Rajnish Bhatnagar carefully considered the arguments presented and examined the facts of the case. The court noted that the initial PCR calls made by the complainant only alleged molestation and the charges of rape were added at a later stage. Additionally, the medical examination conducted on the complainant did not indicate signs of rape but suggested physical assault.

Referring to relevant judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, Justice Bhatnagar emphasized that the severity of the accusations alone should not be the sole basis for denying anticipatory bail. The court emphasized the presumption of innocence and the importance of an individual’s liberty. Taking into account the overall facts and circumstances of the case, the court allowed the bail applications and ordered that if arrested, the petitioners be released on bail upon furnishing a personal bond of Rs. 25,000 each with one surety to the satisfaction of the Arresting Officer/SHO concerned.

READ FULL JUDGEMENT: https://bit.ly/3Bkc33a

-Report by Tushar Yadav

Applications of 299 organisers were rejected by the Ministry of MinorityAffairs out of 810 applications to organize Haj 2023, in the case of AL HATIM TOURS AND TRAVELS PVT. LTD. Vs UNION OF INDIA.

Facts:

The judgement was given by a single judge bench of Delhi High Court, by Justice Pratibha M. Singh. These petitions were filed by Haj Group Organisers (HGOs) for Haj 2023, challenging the public notice dated 5th May 2023 issued by the Ministry of Minority Affairs (Haj Division). By way of the impugned public notice, the Ministry has declared the eligible and ineligible HGOs for Haj 2023. The Ministry of Urban Affairs invited a total of 810 applications for Haj 2023, under 2 categories (244 in Category-1 and 566 in Category-2) out of which, 171 HGOs in Category-1 and 340 HGOs in Category-2 have been found eligible for registration for Haj 2023. The rest of the 280 HGOs were not found eligible for Haj 2023.

Petitioner’s Contention:

The grievance of the petitioners is that they fall on the list of 280 HGOs who have been rendered ineligible as per the above public notice by the Ministry of Minority Affairs. The issue raised by the petitioners is that the reasons for declaring them as ineligible have not been communicated to thePetitioners.

Thus, though the above public notice gives an opportunity to the Petitioners tosubmit a representation by the due date of 8th May 2023 (5:00 pm), since the petitioners are not even aware of the reasons which have rendered themineligible, no representations can be made.

Respondent’s Contention:

The Ministry of Minority Affairs through Mr. S.S Verma, Deputy Secretarysubmitted that the reasons for all of the Petitioners, who have been renderedineligible, are being prepared and shall be served upon all the 280 HGOs latestby tomorrow i.e., 10th May 2023, such HGOs are free to file their

representations within two working days. The representations would bedecided within one week and the allotment of quota would not be exhausted prior to the decision on the representations.

Judgement:

After hearing from both sides, the court came to the conclusion that the totalnumber of visas that are to be allotted to the HGOs this year is 35,005 in whicheach Category-1 and category-2 operators are entitled to 60 visas and 50 visasrespectively. Thus, insofar as the eligible HGOs are concerned, a total of 10,260and 17,000 would be exhausted. There would be a large number of remainingvisas which would have to be dealt with in accordance with the HGO Policy 2023 of the Ministry.

Considering the fact that the reasons for declaring the petitioners have not beencommunicated to the petitioners, the opportunity to make representations by 8thMay 2023 at 5 PM is of no account now, as there is no basis for filing arepresentation. Accordingly, the new directions are issued under which theMinistry will communicate the reasons for ineligibility to the Petitioners on orbefore 10th May 2023 by 6:00 pm. and the petitioners who are aggrieved by thereasons which are communicated to them are free to make their respectiverepresentations to the Ministry by 12th May 2023 midnight, as also remove deficiencies, through the e-mail address mentioned in the public notice. Therepresentations shall be decided by the Ministry and shall be communicated tothe Petitioners through email by 6 pm on 19th May 2023. In case any of the Petitioners are found eligible, their candidature shall be considered for the allotment of the remaining visas in accordance with the Ministry’s Policy.

Judgement on-09/05/23

READ FULL JUDGEMENT: https://bit.ly/41tE2bi

-Report by Himanshi Chauhan

In the present case of Vineet Kumar vs. UOI & Ors, a petition was filed by the petitioner seeking the quashing of an order whereby respondents have not protected his seniority, whereby his request for securing seniority was rejected and whereby DIG has rejected the petitioner’s request.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND:

The petitioner had applied for the post of Sub Inspector in the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF). He was selected in the recruitment process and was offered an appointment letter dated 30.10.2009. He joined the services on an even date. He was posted at Bhubaneshwar and after completion of his training; he joined his place of posting at 39 Bn. Narayanpur, Chhattisgarh.

The respondents had asked for the petitioner’s willingness to undergo a promotional course for promotion to the rank of Inspector. The petitioner had his willingness to join the pre-promotional course but he fell ill with high fever on 19.07.2013. He claims to have been diagnosed with “cerebral malaria” and was admitted to the MI room of the unit. Further, he was shifted to MMI Hospital, Raipur, where it was identified that he was suffering from “Klebsiella Pneumonia with Hepatitis-C”. He was discharged from the hospital on 02.08.2013. However, according to him, the respondents had advised him to medical rest for 20 days and so, he could not participate in the pre-promotional course.

PETITIONER’S CONTENTIONS:

➢ The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the respondents protected the petitioner’s chance for the course but not for his seniority. So, he submitted a representation to the Commandant (CRPF Chhattisgarh) for protection of his seniority which was forwarded to the DIGP, Hyderabad. In the letter, the Commandant mentioned that the petitioner’s case was genuine and he was willing to attend the course but was unable due to illness. The DIG further referred the case of the petitioner to the IG which was rejected stating that chances to attend promotional courses are to be protected. However, seniority is not required to be protected.

➢ The petitioner again sent a representation to DG, CRPF and thereafter, another representation to IGP-CRPF requesting to secure his seniority. It was contended that even Commandant-39 Bn CRPF also prayed to DIG for the protection of the seniority of the petitioner.

➢ The learned counsel further submitted that the respondents have erroneously rejected the petitioner’s representation without noticing the fact that he was posted in a malaria-affected area and his illness was precipitated by the same. So, due to his medical condition only, he could not attend the course and was denied promotion and seniority.

➢ The learned counsel next provides for certain cases wherein a candidate is unable to attend a course due to medical reasons, in such cases a residual power is vested with the DG-CRPF to approve the same.

➢ Further, the counsel submitted that respondents have themselves notified that the personnel wounded or injured while on active Government duty in India or abroad, will be eligible for promotions.

➢ The learned counsel further submitted that the juniors of the petitioner have been promoted to the rank of Inspector but he has not yet been promoted. He contends that his loss of seniority is due to the malaria fever which he got during his service as he was posted in an area which was infected with mosquitoes, unhygienic working conditions and water.

➢ Hence, the rejection of the petitioner’s representation deserves to be set aside by this court.

RESPONDENT’S CONTENTIONS:

➢ The learned counsel for the respondent submitted that it is not disputed that the petitioner had fallen ill and was admitted to Unit Hospital and shifted to District Hospital, Narayanpur. Then he was referred to MMI Hospital, Raipur where he was diagnosed as a case of “Acute Febrile illness HCV Positive”. Thereafter, he was advised medical rest for 20 days due to hepatitis C.

➢ The learned counsel next submitted that it was intimated by the IGP that the petitioner has secured qualifying marks and directed his unit to attendIPC NO. 6 to be conducted at CTC Gwalior. Since the petitioner had been prescribed medical rest, he expressed his inability to attend the same.

➢ The learned counsel further submitted that the respondents have rightly rejected the petitioner’s different representations seeking seniority because as per medical documents, he was suffering from “Klebsiella Pneumonia with Hepatitis-C” whereas he seeks protection of chance and seniority on the ground that Narayanpur District of Chhattisgarh was declared a “malaria-prone area”. It has no relation with the disease actually suffered by him.

➢ The learned counsel next submitted that all the representations made by the petitioner are denied and it was stated that the petitioner was suffering from “Klebsiella Pneumonia with Hepatitis C”, which has nothing to do with malaria. There is no provision to consider personnel suffering from Hepatitis C to treat as attributable to the service conditions.

➢ The learned counsel also submitted that as per the Standing order if a candidate could not be sent for the course on administrative grounds, he will get another opportunity and his original seniority will be protected. Also, as per instructions contained in a letter dated 26.07.2022, the chance of personnel placed in LMC Shape-2 to Shape-4 to attend the promotional course is to be protected and their seniority is not required to be protected. In the present case, the petitioner was categorised as Shape-1 as per standing order and therefore, not eligible for any relaxation. The petitioner could not attend the course due to his illness and so, the IGP has rightly protected his case to attend the course but not seniority.

➢ Lastly, it was submitted that the impugned orders passed in respect of the petitioner are just and proper and need not be set aside by this court.

JUDGEMENT:

The Court opined that there is no dispute that the petitioner had tenderer his willingness to join the promotional course, however, unfortunately, he fell sick and remained hospitalised. Therefore, he could not participate in the said course. The respondents have not considered the case of the petitioner for promotion and seniority on the ground that he was not suffering from Malaria but Hepatitis C. But the Court observes that while making the above observations, the respondents have not considered the recommendations of the Commandant, 39 Bn written to the Dy. IG, Hyderabad, wherein it is admitted that the petitioner was deployed in a malaria-prone area like Narayanpur.

Thereby, the factum of the petitioner’s hospitalization and suffering from illness, attributable to his service conditions, is not disputed. Whether he was suffering from Malaria or Hepatitis-C is of no relevance. What is relevant is that the petitioner has suffered the agony of illness and treatment due to the conditions of his work.

Thus, the Court is of the opinion that the petitioner cannot be made to suffer mental agony to work below his juniors. Accordingly, orders passed by the respondents are hereby set aside. Directions were given to the respondents to pass necessary orders to re-fix the petitioner’s seniority in terms of merit for promotion to the rank of Inspector within six weeks.

READ FULL JUDGEMENT: https://bit.ly/3nkeRdw

-Report by Arunima Jain

The Delhi High Court on Friday carefully examined Order XIV Rule 5 & Order XI of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 while adjudicating the present case. Herein, it has been made amply clear by the court that when filing additional documents in a commercial lawsuit, the plaintiff cannot claim that these are in response to the arguments made by the defendant in the written statement. Order XI of the CPC as it relates to commercial lawsuits would be completely disregarded if it allowed a party to file supplementary papers at any point.

FACTS

In the matter at hand, the plaintiff had pre-existent issues already filed in front of the Hon’bleCourt in the current matter. The present application was filed on behalf of the plaintiff toinclude an additional issue faced by the plaintiff. It was submitted before the court that anissue regarding the rendition of accounts by the defendant had not been framed while preparing for the evidence, in the issues provided. A Local Commissioner was appointed on December 16th, 2022, to record the testimony in the case. The plaintiff has submittedaffidavit-based evidence, but the testimony has not yet been entered into the record.

CONTENTIONS

Petitioner

The petitioner’s learned counsel has submitted before the High Court that while preparing forthe evidence in the case, the plaintiff accidentally became aware that the problem surroundingthe defendant’s rendition of accounts had not been framed. The averments contained in

paragraph 15 of the plaint about the defendant’s rendition of accounts was drawn attention.The defendant has refuted the information in this very paragraph in a written statement. Moreover, the plaintiff asserts that the Licence Agreement between the parties was terminatedon December 30, 2016, that there is no longer an active contract between the parties, and that the defendant is only making payments to the plaintiff in accordance with temporary ordersissued by this Court.

Respondent

Contrary to the petitioner’s counsel, the respondent’s learned counsel submits that onNovember 28, 2019, when the problems in the lawsuit were being framed, the Court did notframe any such issue regarding the rendering of accounts. This was due to the fact that theLicence Agreement that governed the plaintiff and defendant’s relationship required thedefendant to pay the plaintiff an annual licence fee. As a result, it was unnecessary to framethe problem of the defendant producing a statement of finances. In addition to that, theplaintiff should have provided the aforementioned documents with the plaint because it washis responsibility to prove his ownership of the works that are the subject of the current lawsuit when he filed it. Furthermore, it is claimed that the current application was submitted more than three years after the issues were first framed. The plaintiff has been unable toprovide any justification for failing to include the papers with the replication.

JUDGEMENT

Upon giving due regard to the facts and law in the above-mentioned case, it is contended bythe Hon’ble Court that it is clear from the contentions by both the parties and the precedentsthat the plaintiff has clearly argued that the documents are being presented to refute theposition put up by the defendant and, as a result, could not have been filed at the time the complaint was filed. However, the plaintiff has not explained why the aforementioned documents were not filed with the replication. Moreover, the plaintiff has also missed from providing just cause as to failing to provide reasonable cause for untimely filing. If a party isallowed to file additional documents at any point throughout the suit, the entire purpose of the CPC regulations relevant to commercial lawsuits would be negated. Accordingly, the present application in the High Court of Delhi has been dismissed.

READ FULL JUDGEMENT: https://bit.ly/3LCJzb1

-Report by Sakshi Tanwar

The current petition for Letters of Administration has been filed by the mother [petitioner no.1], father [petitioner no.2], and brother [petitioner no.3] of the late Dr. Shruti Maitri,who died in Delhi on March 8, 2019. The LoA has been claimed in relation to properties.

FACTS

The second respondent is admittedly the deceased’s spouse, while respondents 3 and 4 arebodies formed to administer superannuation money in the Australian state of New SouthWales. According to the petitioners’ acknowledged case, the deceased married the secondrespondent in Delhi on December 3, 2017, in accordance with Hindu norms. According totheir claim, the deceased was injured on 02/03 February 2019 and travelled to India on 01March 2019 for necessary medical procedures and treatment. The petitioners also state thatthe deceased was admitted to a hospital on March 4, 2019, and underwent surgery onMarch 5, 2019. According to reports, the deceased developed a pulmonary embolism as aresult of post-operative complications on March 7, 2019, and died on March 8, 2019. The petition was based on an assumption that the first petitioner had been nominated as the beneficiary of the superannuation funds. In terms of an intimation dated 19 August 2019,the first petitioner was informed by respondent no. 3 of the proposed release of all monies standing to the credit of the superannuation fund of the deceased in favour of the secondrespondent.

APPEALANT’S CONTENTION

The petitioners maintained that because the deceased was an Indian citizen working inAustralia on a work permit, her inheritance would be administered under Indian law. Thepetitioners claimed in paragraph 35 of the current petition that the deceased had identifieda flat in Australia and, since she had not been given Permanent Resident status in thatcountry, the flat was purchased in the name of the second respondent. It is conceded thatthe flat was mortgaged and the instalments in respect thereof were paid out of the jointaccount maintained by the deceased and the second respondent. The petition for the grant of LoA was essentially based on the petitioners’ assertion that because the deceased and the second respondent purchased the properties in Australia together, with the formermaking substantial investments therein, the petitioners would be entitled to the grant of LoA by virtue of being the parents. Their claimed case was that the second respondent, thehusband,

is barred from pre-marriage and paternal assets. On 19 December 2019, the Court granted an injunction restraining the second respondent from either alienating or creating third-party interests in the immovable property in Australia or receiving superannuation funds standing to the credit of the investments made by the deceased. The Court also restrainedRespondent No. 3 from releasing any payments to either the second respondent or any third party.

RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION

The second respondent has filed objections to this petition, citing records kept by the FirstState Super Trustee Corporation, a body corporate established under the SuperannuationAdministration Act, 19965, as well as records kept by the State Super Financial ServicesAustralia Limited, to argue that the second respondent was the sole beneficiary of thesuperannuation funds. Reliance was also placed on the adjudicatory orders passed by theAustralian Financial Complaints Authority8 which too had recognized the right of thesecond respondent to be the sole beneficiary of all funds of the deceased held withrespondent no.3.

JUDGEMENT

The law, as it presently stands, does not envisage a parent who may have incurredexpenditure in the upbringing of a child being viewed as a creditor. Accordingly, and forall the aforesaid reasons, the petition fails and shall stand dismissed.

READ FULL JUDGEMENT: https://bit.ly/40QREgG

-Report by Mehul Jain

It was held by the Delhi High Court in the case of Daulat Ram Dharam Bir Auto Private Limited & Ors Vs Pivotal Infrastructure Private Limited & Ors. that on April 27, the learned Arbitrator shall fix his fee in consultation with the counsel for the parties. All the contentions of the parties are left open to be decided by the learned Arbitrator. The learned Arbitrator shall give his disclosure in terms of section 12 of the Act of 1996. It is the conclusion of the Delhi High Court.

FACTS

The judgment is made by the learned Single Judge bench â€œHon’ble Mr Justice V. Kameswar Rao” On 27 April 2023. 

It is a case where the petitioner’s Nos. 1 to 3 („Petitioner Group‟) are companies duly incorporated under the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956 („Act of 1956‟), have filed the instant petition under section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Whereas respondent No. 1 herein, is also a company duly incorporated under the provisions of the Act of 1956, having its registered office at Plot No.12, Sector-4, Faridabad, Haryana-121004. It is stated that respondent No. 2 is also a company duly incorporated under the provisions of the Act of 1956 and was earlier a part of the Petitioner Group. However, currently the same is under liquidation and is thus being sued through its Liquidator appointed by the National Company Law Tribunal. 

Facts leading to the filing of the instant petition (as it relates to the Petitioner Group) are: that the Petitioner Group together with respondent No.2, each of whom owned a piece of land, handed over the possession of a parcel of their lands to the respondent No.3 (which is also a company incorporated under the provisions of the Act of 1956, [„Original Developer‟ herein]) and permitted the latter to develop, construct and complete the building on such lands, i.e., built-up area at projects titled as „Royal Heritage‟ & „Faridabad Eye‟ under License No. 78 of 2009 & 33 of 2010, granted by Directorate of Town and Country Planning, Haryana, („DTCP‟), Haryana, [„project land‟]. While the Petitioner Group and Respondent No.2 provided their piece of land for the development and construction of buildings, respondent No.3, in exchange for the same, undertook the obligation to provide a 10% share in the built-up area of the project land to the Petitioner Group.

It is stated, the Petitioner Group and the Respondent No. 2 companies transferred the development rights over the said project land to Respondent No.3 through Collaboration Agreements dated June 04, 2007, while retaining the rights, title and interest to the land underneath amongst themselves. So, in light of forgoing facts and circumstances, the Petitioner Group has filed the present petition seeking the appointment of a Sole Arbitrator for adjudication of disputes which have arisen between the Petitioner Group and respondent No.1.

PETITIONER’S CONTENTION

Whereas it has been extensively submitted by Mr Rajiv Bajaj, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioner Group that the obligation of giving 10% of the built-up area back to the Petitioner Group became legally ascertainable only on the issuance of the Occupation Certificates (i.e., on November 30, 2017, June 25, 2018, and August 17, 2020) by the DTCP, Haryana and as on date Occupation Certificates in respect of Towers no. l and no. 2, are yet to be received by respondent no. l. Reliance in this regard has been placed on section 264 of the Haryana Municipality Act, 1994.

They submitted that the claim of 10% built-up area has never been sought before any Court or Tribunal as the same became legally ascertainable only when the Flats built on the project land received necessary approvals in the form of Occupation Certificates. 

They submitted that the claims sought by the Petitioner Group are well within the period of limitation as the project is yet to be completed, and even otherwise, before the grant of the Occupation Certificate, the units could not have been identified and allocated to the Petitioner Group. So, they contended that the present petition is well within the period of limitation and thus, the same should be allowed and disputes be referred to arbitration. 

So, it is the case of the Petitioner Group and so contended by Mr Rajiv Bajaj, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioner Group that if the afore-said reliefs, as sought, are not granted then they shall be left with no remedy, as the respondent No.1 shall, alienate the 10% built-up area falling under the share of the Petitioner Group under the Collaboration Agreements, Deed of Assignment and all other documentations, to unaware homebuyers.

RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION

Mr Harish Malhotra learned senior counsel appearing for respondent No.2, that the obligation of giving 10% built-up area back to the Petitioner Group became legally ascertainable only on the issuance of the Occupation Certificates (i.e., on November 30, 2017, June 25, 2018, and August 17, 2020) by the DTCP, Haryana and as on date Occupation Certificates in respect of Towers no. l and no. 2, are yet to be received by respondent no. l. Reliance in this regard has been placed on section 264 of the Haryana Municipality Act, 1994.

It is also their submission that the present dispute arises out of respondent No.1 undertaking the obligations of respondent No.3 (Original Developer) under the Collaboration Agreements by way of the Deed of Assignment.

It is also their submission that the present petition is not barred by the contours of res judicata (constructive as well) or Order II Rule 2 of the CPC.

On the other hand, in essence, it is Mr Singh’s primary submission that claims sought to be referred to arbitration by the Petitioner Group: (i) are not arbitrable; (ii) are barred by limitation; and (iii) have already been adjudicated between the parties in previous civil and arbitral proceedings. So, he submitted that when the petition under section 11 of the Act of 1996 is itself not maintainable then on this ground alone, the instant petition should also be dismissed.

So, on the afore-said grounds, Mr Singh has argued for the dismissal of the instant petition.

COURT’S DECISION

Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record, at the outset, it may be stated, this petition has been filed by the Petitioner Group. A prayer has also been made on behalf of respondent No.2 for allowing it to participate in the arbitral proceedings as the claimant for its share in the built-up area, to avoid multiplicity of litigation. The Notice invoking the Arbitration Clause was sent by respondent No.2 only on October 19, 2022, i.e., during the pendency of these proceedings. It is not known whether any reply has been sent by respondent No.1 to the said Notice. In any case, in the absence of a substantive petition by respondent No.2, the aforesaid prayer in these proceedings cannot be accepted. Nonetheless, nothing precludes respondent No.2 to seek reference following the law. 

The reliance placed by Mr Malhotra on the judgment of the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Raghuvir Buildcon Pvt. Ltd. v. Ircon International Limited, (2021) SCC OnLine Del 2491, in support of his contention that the claim of 10% share in the developed area by the Land Owners has not been settled by former the arbitration proceedings. Because of my above discussion, the petition under section 11 of the Act of 1996 needs to be allowed. 

I accordingly appoint Justice Rajiv Sahai Endlaw, former Judge of this Court as the learned Arbitrator to adjudicate the dispute(s) which have arisen between the Petitioner Group and respondent No.1, in respect of 10% of the built-up land. 

The learned Arbitrator shall fix his fee in consultation with the counsel for the parties. All the contentions of the parties are left open to be decided by the learned Arbitrator. The learned Arbitrator shall give his disclosure in terms of section 12 of the Act of 1996.

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-Report Himanshi Chauhan

The recent judgement of P.V. Satheesan v. UOI & Ors deals with the question that whether a person can get absorbed in the department to which he had gone on deputation. Herein, the original application of the person was rejected by the Tribunal. Therefore, a writ petition was filed in the Delhi High Court challenging the order passed by the Tribunal.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND:

The petitioner was appointed as LDC in General Reserve Engineering Force (‘GREF’ in short). He was selected as LDC on a deputation basis in CBI on September 13, 2002. He initially worked in Chennai. In 2004, he applied for permanent absorption in CBI. Subsequently, on May 3, 2005, he was transferred to Delhi. CBI required a NOC for the petitioner’s permanent absorption in CBI. According to the petitioner, on March 24, 2005, GRPF/ parent department issued NOC for his absorption. But even after submitting NOC, CBI did not absorb deputationist as LDC/ SCS in CBI.

Thereafter, CBI requested for further extension of the petitioner’s deputation in CBI but the GREF did not accede to the same request. Accordingly, the Head Office of CBI vides Fax directed SP, CBI, AC-II to repatriate the petitioner to his parent department by March 26, 2006. 

Therefore, the petitioner approached the Central Administrative Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi. However, the original application of the petitioner was dismissed by the Tribunal stating that a person underlying deputation has no right to continue for long on deputation or get absorbed in the department to which he had gone on the department. 

The petitioner, therefore, aggrieved by the order of the Tribunal moves to the Delhi High Court.

PETITIONER’S CONTENTIONS:

➢ The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner joined the CBI on December 10, 2002, on a deputation basis and subsequently, as requested by the CBI, the GREF gave NOC for the absorption of the petitioner. However, after receiving NOC, the CBI denied the permanent absorption of the petitioner.

➢ The learned counsel further submits that the petitioner has served CBI for more than 20 years and in fact, he is superannuating on April 30, 2023.

➢ Furthermore, during his service in CBI, his work has been appreciated by the CBI by conferring “CBI Day Award”, “ATI UTKRISHT SEWA PATAK, 2016” and Commendation Certificates in 2006, 2015, 2016 & 2017.

➢ The learned counsel further submits that in the given background, if the petitioner is compelled to be repatriated then his entire family would be put to irreparable loss and injury.

➢ The learned counsel further states that it would be inequitable for the respondents to repatriate the petitioner to GREF, at this point, when the petitioner is on the verge of retirement after putting in more than 20 years of service which is more than his tenure in GREF.

RESPONDENT’S CONTENTIONS:

➢ The learned counsel for the respondent (CBI) submitted that the petitioner cannot claim absorption as a matter of right when CBI has already decided not to absorb deputation’s LDC/ SCS. 

➢ He also submitted that, since 2005, no absorption of deputations LDC/ SCS has been effected.

➢ The learned counsel further relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Kunal Nanda v. UOI & Anr., (2000) 5 SCC 362, in this case, the petitioner, who had come on deputation from CRPF, sought his absorption in CBI. This request was rejected and he was repatriated. The decision was upheld by the Supreme Court. The learned counsel, therefore, contends that similar should be the outcome in this case as well.

JUDGEMENT:

The Delhi High Court observes that the petitioner has worked for 12 years in GREF as against 20 years of service in the CBI. Therefore, the court held that it is inequitable to deny the absorption of the petitioner in CBI. Insofar as the judgement of Kunal Nanda is concerned, the same shall not be applicable to the facts of this case, as the CBI (in that case) has rejected the prayer of the petitioner for absorption in CBI on the ground of unreliability. But in the present case, there is no issue of integrity raised by the CBI against the petitioner herein.

Thereby, the High Court opined that the petitioner should be absorbed in the CBI from the date when NOC was given by the GREF with all the consequential benefits that would flow pursuant to his absorption in CBI from that date. Accordingly, the Hon’ble High Court set aside the impugned order passed by the Tribunal.

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-Report by Arunima Jain

Adjudicating the matter of life imprisonment on a rarest of rare cases of a man raping his 9-year-old daughter, the Delhi High Court on Tuesday held that the term ‘life imprisonment’ is synonymous with a convict spending the rest of their life imprisoned for whatever they have been convicted for. Liberal remissions to diminish the sentence of the life imprisonmentgranted to the convict in the present case would in factuality, be nothing short of a travesty ofjustice. Judges who wield the sword of justice should not hesitate to wield that sword with the utmost severity to the full and to the end if the seriousness of the offence so requires, as thisCourt noted in Madan Gopal Kakkad Vs. Naval Dubey and another.

FACTS

In the matter at hand, the appellant was tried for raping his own 9-year-old daughter in August 2012. In accordance with the same, the Sessions Court (Special Fast-track Court) hadheld the appellant guilty of the same in 2013 and had adjudicated the appellant for lifeimprisonment under Sections 376, 377 7 506 of the IPC. Additionally, the appellant was alsonot granted clemency by the State until and unless he had served at least 20 years ofimprisonment. On appeal, a Division Bench of the High Court of Delhi further upheld theprevious court’s judgement in 2017. As a last resort, this special leave petition was filedunder Article 136 of the Constitution. This appeal was filed to merely discuss the magnitude of the sentence imposed on the convicted person, and not to elaborate on the conviction.

JUDGEMENT

Upon giving due regard to the facts and law in the above-mentioned case, it is contended bythe Hon’ble High Court that the appellant is liable for serving at least 30 years ofimprisonment upon taking into account remissions His lengthy incarceration would not only guarantee that he received his just rewards but would also give his daughter more time and maturity to calm down and move on with her life, even if her father is released. Owing to the amendments leading to the inclusion of the new sections 376(2)(f) and 376(3) in the IPC in 2013, the legal recourse adopted by the Sessions Fast-track Court had been wrong in technicality since the newer provisions would not have been applicable as the present case had been instituted in 2012. But owing to the gravity and severity of this case, the monstrosityimposed by the father on his own daughter led to the High Court deciding the present case. The appeal therefore has been dismissed and the appellant/convicted has been directed to payhis dues accordingly.

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-Report by Sakshi Tanwar

This is the second application under Section 439 read with Section 436A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 seeking regular bail in case FIR No. 166/2015, dated 16.11.2015, recorded at P.S. Crime Branch under Sections 3 and 9 of the Official Secrets Act, 1923. The initial application filed on behalf of the current applicant was rejected as withdrawn by a coordinate bench of this Court on February 31, 2018, with an instruction to the learned trial Court to expedite the trial.

FACTS

P.S. Crime Branch obtained classified information on alleged anti-national acts supported by Pakistan-based intelligence operatives. The operation in question was handled by an Indian. Information about the deployment of the Indian Army and the Border Security Force (“BSF”) in Jammu and Kashmir and passed it on to people across the border, threatening national security. The mobile phone numbers involved were intercepted, and the names of two people engaged – Kafaitullah Khan and Abdul Rasheed surfaced. Kafaitullah Khan lived in Rajouri and Abdul Rasheed served in the BSF. It was found that Abdul Rasheed gave classified material to Kafaitullah Khan in exchange for money, who then gave it to Pakistan intelligence operatives.  

Kafaitullah Khan came across his close friend Mohammad Saber, i.e., the present applicant, who was a primary school teacher. In confidence, Kafaitullah Khan told the applicant about his meeting with the aforesaid Pakistan intelligence officer and the task assigned to him. He agreed to the task by taking some money. Kafaitullah Khan got in touch with an ex-serviceman, Munawar, through the present applicant. Farid Khan had passed on some documents to Munawar, which were then passed on to Faizal-ur-Rehman through the present applicant. Mobile phones were recovered from Kafaitullah Khan, Abdul Rasheed, Munawar Ahmed Mir, Farid Khan and the present applicant. The Call Detail Records showed that the accused were in touch. Bank account details of all the accused persons were obtained from the concerned banksand it was found that Rs. 10,000/- were deposited in the account of the applicant. 

The found documents pertaining to the Indian Army were forwarded to the appropriate authorities for examination. It was discovered that the aforementioned documents were classified in nature. Following the completion of the investigation, the first chargesheet in the current case against Abdul Rasheed Khan, Munawar Ahmed Mir, Farid Ahmed, Kafaitullah Khan, and the present application was filed on February 23, 2016.

APPEALANT’S SIDE

The applicant, according to learned counsel acting on his behalf, was detained on December 5, 2015, and has been in judicial detention for more than 7 years. It was also claimed that he had been imprisoned for more than half the maximum time permitted for the crimes he was accused of committing. As a result, the petitioner is eligible to be released on bail under Section 436A of the CrPC. It was further submitted that the applicant was not named in the FIR and the allegations against him are solely on the basis of the disclosure of Kafaitullah Khan and Abdul Rasheed. Learned counsel for the application testified that no incriminating material had been obtained from the applicant’s possession or from his domicile. Furthermore, no incriminating evidence was discovered on his laptop or camera. It was submitted that the prosecution has not been able to connect the Rs. 10,000/- transferred to the bank account of the applicant with any of the allegations made against him. Learned counsel further submitted that there is no evidence on record which shows that the data alleged to be transmitted was passed on by the applicant.

JUDGEMENT

In view of the facts and circumstances of the present case, the applicant is admitted to bail upon his furnishing a personal bond in the sum of Rs. 1,00,000/- along with two sureties of the like amount, one of which should be a relative of the applicant, to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court/Link Court, further subject to some conditions.

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