– Report by Mahija Sinha

The Supreme Court in the case of  M/S. Emmar India Ltd. V. Tarun Aggarwal Projects LLP & Anr.  has stated that the HC must perform a preliminary inquiry to determine if the dispute is arbitrable to justify the appointment of arbitrators in an application under Sections 11(5) and (6) of the Arbitration Act.

FACTS

The appellants challenged the Delhi High Court’s decision and ruling in the Arbitration Petition in a civil appeal. Both parties had entered into a Collaboration Agreement and a subsequent Addendum Agreement for building a residential colony in Gurugram’s Sector 62 and 65. The parties got into a dispute, and the respondents, in this case, claimed that the appellant had broken the Addendum Agreement’s responsibilities. The respondents sent a legal notice demanding actual control of five plots totalling 2160 square yards and alleging losses of Rs. 10 crores. The disagreement was arbitrable, according to the respondents in this case, and an ex-High Court judge was chosen as the arbitrator. However, the appellants, in this case, reject the arbitrator’s appointment. As a result, the respondents, in this case, submitted an application under Sections 11(5) and (6) of the Arbitration Act asking the Court to select the arbitrators in accordance with Clause 37 of the Addendum Agreement. The appellants made a number of arguments in opposition to the aforementioned arbitration petition. The High Court granted the application under sections 11(5) and (6) of the Arbitration Act and appointed the arbitrator while keeping in mind clauses 36 and 37 of the Addendum clause. This infuriated the appellants, who then brought the current appeal.

APPELLANT’S CONTENTION

The legal representatives for the appellant argued that the High Court completely overlooked the fact that, in the appellant’s opinion, the issue occurs under Clause 36 of the Agreement and not Clause 37 while granting the application under Sections 11(5) and (6) and selecting the arbitrators. They referred to the cases Vidya Drolia and Ors. v. Durga Trading Corporation and Indian Oil Corporation Limited v. NCC Limited, where the Court noted “that at the stage of Section 11 of the Arbitration Act, a preliminary” injunction must be filed, and Uttarakhand Purv Sainik Kalyan Nigam Limited v. Northern Coal Field Limited, where it was held that the appointment of an arbitrator could be refused if the arbitration agreement is not in writing. As a result, it was finally argued that the High Court must conduct a preliminary investigation to determine whether the disagreement between the parties is covered by Clause 36 of the Agreement

RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION

Referring to Vidya Drolia and Others v. Durga Trading Corporation, the legal representatives for respondents argued that it would be best to leave the decision of whether or not the dispute is arbitrable to the arbitrator in a request made under Section 16 of the Arbitration Act, as it is the arbitrator’s job to make that determination. He continued by saying that the High Court’s selection of the arbitrators was correct, given a combined reading of Clauses 36 and 37 of the Agreement and the parties’ determination to settle their dispute through arbitration in accordance with the Arbitration Act.

COURT’S DECISION

 The bench of Justice M.R. Shah and Justice Krishna Murari observed that

“Applying the law laid down by this Court in the aforesaid decisions and considering Clauses 36 and 37 of the Agreement and when a specific plea was taken that the dispute falls within Clause 36 and not under Clause 37 and therefore, the dispute is not arbitrable, the High Court was at least required to hold a primary inquiry/review, and prima facie come to a conclusion on whether the dispute is arbitrable. Without conducting this preliminary investigation and despite knowing the fact that a party does have the right to seek enforcement of an agreement before a court of law as per Clause 36, the arbitrators were only appointed after it was noted that the 1996 Arbitration and Conciliation Act does not preclude the resolution of disputes through arbitration.”

The Court stated that the High Court, however, did not recognize or consider that a dispute involving the enforcement of the Agreement as described in Clauses 3, 6, and 9 is not subject to arbitration at all. According to this interpretation, the High Court’s contested judgment and order appointing the arbitrators is invalid and should be repealed and overturned.

Report by Rhea Mistry

In Ircon International Ltd. v. Reacon Engineers (India) Ltd., on 10th June 2019, the petitioner filed the petition under section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, contesting an arbitral award given by a Single Arbitrator-Led Arbitral Tribunal. Concerning the agreement made on 16.06.2010, there was a disagreement between the parties which made them opt for the arbitration settlement.

Contentions by the Respondent

The respondent contended that the petition filed by the petitioner was filed after the period for filing had expired. Under the Limitation Act, the period under which a petition shall be filed is three months and the petitioner filed the petition on 13th September 2019 when the last date to file was 12th September 2019. The petitioner has not submitted any legal paperwork asking for a delayed pardon. The respondents also asserted that initially when the petition was filed, there was no attachment made to it, i.e., contested award, statement of truth, and the vakalatnama was not attached. The petition was unsigned and when it was re-filed by the petitioner, it was after the court’s window for tolerating delays.

Referring to the case Union of India v. Bharat Biotech International Ltd. and INX News Pvt. Ltd. v Pier One Construction Pvt. Ltd. to support his contentions, he stated that the petition that was filed on 24th October 2019 cannot be regarded as the same as filed on 13th September 2019.

Contentions by the Petitioner

The petitioner claimed that the contested award was received by him on 12th June 2019 and was delivered on 10th June 2019. They filed the petition one day after the expiration of filing the petition i.e., on 13th September 2019, and as per section 34(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, the petition can be filed within three months from the date of receipt of the arbitral award.

The petition that was filed on 13th September 2019 was 73 pages and the registry returned the petition on 16th September 2019 stating that it was defective and did not contain any attestation on affidavits, awards, documents, or statement of truth, there were also no bookmarks, and the pages were without page numbers. The petition was refiled on 24th October 2019, with a total of 1325 pages. The registry again said the petition is still defective and returned it on 30th October 2019 to be re-filed. It was refiled on 6th November 2019 and again returned on 13th November 2019 with defects, it was refiled on 14th November 2019 and returned yet again as defective on 15th November 2019 and refiled on 18th November 2019 to cure some defects, and finally was refiled on 19th November 2019.

The counsel of the petitioner claimed that even though there was a delay of one day, he applied to explain that he had met with an accident and could not attend to file the petition for three weeks.

Decision

There was a delay of thirty-seven days in filing the petition, so the petitioner has submitted absolutions for the delay of thirty-seven days in re-filing the petition but did not submit absolution for the delay in filing the initial petition.

The initial petition filed on 13th September 2019 was only seventy-three pages and did not contain any attachments which were mandatory such as the contested award and the statement of truth. On 24th October 2019 the petition was filed which contained 1325 pages with all the proper attachments, attested, signed, and formatted as prescribed.

The court stated in favor of the respondent’s contention that the petition which was filed on 24th October 2019 cannot be considered the same petition filed on 13th September 2019 as they are completely different. The court noted that the petition as filed on 13th September did not contain the impugned award or vakalatnama. Considering the same, the case of Union of India v. Bharat Biotech International Ltd is substantially applicable to the facts of this case and so the filings made on 13th September 2019 cannot be considered a valid submission.

The filing made on 24th October 2019 is considered the first date of filing in the present petition. This filing is made after three months period of filing and as per the Limitation Act, it is beyond the period the court can condone.
The petition stands dismissed due to the limitation and all the pending applications are also dismissed with this petition.