Author: LEXPEEPS editor

-Report by Umang Kanwat

If the High Court is the common High Court for two or more States under Article 231 of the Constitution and both the Civil Courts (transferor and transferee) are subordinate to it, the power under Section 24 of the Civil Code of Procedure may be exercised by the High Court even for the interstate transfer of a suit, appeal, or another proceeding. Section 25 applies to the interstate transfer of a suit, appeal, or another proceeding where both States have a High Court under Article 214 of the Constitution. The present case of Shah Newaz Khan & Ors. V State Of Nagaland & Ors. deals with an appeal regarding the issue of such an interstate transfer of suits between courts.

FACTS:

A request to transfer a case from the district judge’s court in Dimapur, Nagaland, to the district judge’s court in Guwahati, Assam, was denied by the Gauhati High Court in this case. Two issues, in particular, were raised before the Apex Court in the present appeal :

(1) According to section 25 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereafter referred to as “the CPC”), is the Supreme Court the only body with the authority to order the transfer of a lawsuit, appeal, or another process from a civil court in one state to a civil court in another state?
(2) Is it permissible for a High Court to consider a transfer request under section 24 of the CPC and transfer a suit, appeal, or another proceeding from one Civil Court to another Civil Court for consideration and decision if the High Court is the common High Court for two or more States?

APPELLANT’S CONTENTIONS:

The appellant argued that if the High Court is the common High Court for two or more States according to Article 231 of the Constitution and both the Civil Courts (transferor and transferee) are subordinate to it, the power under Section 24 of the CPC may be exercised by the High Court even for the interstate transfer of a suit, appeal, or another proceeding. Section 25 applies to the interstate transfer of a suit, appeal, or another proceeding where both States have a High Court according to Article 214 of the Constitution. The learned advocate prayed before the court for a new review of the appellants’ request under section 24 of the CPC. As an alternative, he argued that section 25 applicability can be taken into account by us on its own merits.

RESPONDENT’S CONTENTIONS:

The respondent retaliated that the provisions of both sections 24 and 25 of the Code must be examined because this involves an inter-State transfer and not an intra-State transfer simplicity to understand whether the common High Court has the authority to withdraw any suit, appeal, or other proceeding pending before any Court subordinate to it from one State and to transfer the same to any Court subordinate to it, in another State. After taking into account the arguments made, it is obvious that the legislative intent was clear: under section 25 of the CPC, only the Supreme Court has the power to ordain the transfer of a lawsuit, appeal, or another legal proceeding from one civil court in a state to another civil court in a different state. The CPC’s section 25 expressly and only grants this authority, hence a High Court cannot use it.

The legal counsel for the respondent argued in favour of upholding the contested judgement rather than having it overturned.

JUDGEMENT:

The questions framed at the beginning of this case were answered by concluding that :

(1) Section 25 of the CPC applies to an interstate transfer of a lawsuit, appeal, or another proceeding when both States have a high court under Article 214 of the Constitution, but not when both States have a common high court under Article 231 of the Constitution; and 46.

(2)Additionally, if the High Court is the common High Court for two or more States under Article 231 of the Constitution and both the Civil Courts (transferor and transferee) are subordinate to it, it may exercise the power under Section 24 of the CPC even for the inter-State transfer of a suit, appeal, or another proceeding.

The supreme court asked the Gauhati High Court to give the application under section 24 of the CPC a reasonable amount of priority and to resolve it as soon as feasible, provided that it is convenient for all parties. Additionally, it directed the Parties to pay their expenses.

READ FULL JUDGEMENT: https://bit.ly/3Ye9N6D

About the Organization

Leficon Legal Partners has been a long-standing trusted partner for sophisticated global clients and key players in the market in cross-border litigation and investigations. We offer seamless and integrated services worldwide for cross-border disputes and litigation with extensive experience in individual jurisdictions but also a strong understanding of the interplay between different legal systems and regulations. Our qualified and dedicated team of lawyers and company secretaries is focused on resolving high-risk litigation matters and regulatory investigations.

Position

Legal Intern (most preferred last year Law Student)

Eligibility

Students/ Freshers/ Junior Advocates having some experience

Location

In-office Internship, Pune- 411004.

Practising area

1. Corporate Law
2. Commercial Law
3. Financial Law
4. Civil & Criminal
5. Family Matters

How to apply

Interested candidates kindly mail your CV along with SOP/ brief summary in the mail stating how you are interested and appropriate for this post. E-mail- leficonlegalinfo@gmail.com.

Note- Kindly put the subject of the mail as APPLICATION FOR LEGAL INTERN.

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-Report by Eshna Ray

The Supreme Court in the recent judgement of AMAN SEMI-CONDUCTORS (PVT.) LTD. VERSUS HARYANA STATE INDUSTRIAL DEVLOPMENT CORPORATION LTD. & ANR., passes required conditions that the Respondent needs to follow for the industrial plot allotment, failure to comply which will have consequences.

FACTS:

The appeals, brought by special leave, concern orders issued by the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (NCDRC). The NCDRC allowed a revision petition filed by the respondent corporation, Haryana State Industrial Development Corporation (HSIDC), which had resumed an industrial plot allotted to the appellant, a proprietary concern, for failing to fulfill the terms and conditions of the allotment. The appellant had applied for the plot in 1994, and possession was handed over in 1995, but no concrete steps were taken to set up the industrial unit on the site. The appellant sought extensions of time, citing the absence of basic infrastructure facilities, but failed to produce any concrete evidence or document to satisfy HSIDC. The NCDRC held that the appellant’s grounds and reasons were vague and evasive and that HSIDC was justified in resuming the plot. These appeals challenge the NCDRC’s orders.

APPELLANT’S CONTENTIONS:

The appellant’s learned counsel, Mr. Rajiv K. Garg, argued that the appellant did not violate any of the terms of the allotment letter and had taken all the necessary steps in accordance with the terms of the allotment letter. The appellant had obtained the required certificate from the Industrial Department, applied for a power connection from the electrical department and deposited the requisite amount with the HSEB, and applied for financial assistance with the Financial Corporation. The appellant had also arranged for the required facilities from outside when they were not granted due to a change in government policy. The appellant’s counsel argued that the appellant did not violate any terms of the allotment letter and had taken all necessary steps, including obtaining certificates and applying for power connection and financial assistance. The appellant’s delay was due to government policy changes and not releasing capital. The counsel also contended that the resumption order was issued without granting an opportunity to the appellant and was non-speaking, which violated the principles of natural justice.

RESPONDENT’S CONTENTIONS:

In response to Mr. Garg’s arguments, Mr. Sangwan urged the court not to interfere with the NCDRC’s findings. He stated that the record showed that the appellant was given sufficient opportunity and a show cause notice was issued to him asking why he had not taken steps to construct an industrial unit on the plot. He argued that the overall objective of the scheme under which plots were allotted was to promote industrialization and ensure employment, and the persistent inaction of the appellant suggested that he was not interested in using the plot for any industrial activity.

Mr. Sangwan further highlighted that the allotment was based on the appraisal of the project proposed by the applicant and its feasibility, and the appellant was obliged to take swift and timely action towards putting up the unit as per the conditions in the allotment letter. He also argued that the allotment was hedged with several conditions, and many of them, upon violation, entailed cancellation. Therefore, he contended that HSIDC’s action in resuming the plot was not abhorrent or reprehensible.

JUDGEMENT:

The case revolves around the appellant’s allotment of an industrial plot by HSIDC and the subsequent cancellation of the allotment. The appellant claims that the cancellation was done without a hearing and violated principles of natural justice. Additionally, the lack of essential infrastructural facilities prevented construction within the stipulated time frame. The allotment had conditions for construction and production, and failure to comply could result in resumption by HSIDC. HSIDC could also call for periodical reports about the project’s progress.

Conditions for the industrial plot allotment included starting construction within six months and completing it within 1 1/2 years, as well as commencing production within two years of possession after constructing a minimum of 25% of the permissible covered area. Failure to meet these requirements would result in HSIDC resuming the plot, and the corporation could request periodic reports every six months about the project’s progress.

READ FULL JUDGEMENT: https://bit.ly/3kJn5u9

CITATION

(2017) 9 SCC 1

INTRODUCTION

The case of Shayara Bano vs Union of India refers to a landmark judgment by the Supreme Court of India in 2017 that upheld the constitutional validity of the practice of Triple Talaq or instant divorce among Muslims in India. The case was filed by Shayara Bano, a Muslim woman from Uttarakhand, who challenged the practice of Triple Talaq, which allows Muslim men to divorce their wives by saying “Talaq” three times in one go, without giving any reasons or going through the legal process.

FACTS

Shayara Bano vs Union of India is a landmark case that challenged the practice of Triple Talaq or instant divorce among Muslims in India. The case was filed by Shayara Bano, a Muslim woman from Uttarakhand, who had been married to Rizwan Ahmed for 15 years and had two children. In October 2015, her husband divorced her by sending a letter with the word “Talaq” written thrice. Shayara Bano was devastated by the sudden and arbitrary divorce and decided to challenge the practice of Triple Talaq in court.

Shayara Bano’s petition challenged the legality of Triple Talaq, Nikah Halala, and polygamy, which are practices prevalent among the Muslim community in India. Triple Talaq is a practice that allows Muslim men to divorce their wives by saying “Talaq” three times in one go, without giving any reasons or going through the legal process. Nikah Halala is a practice where a divorced woman has to marry another man, consummate the marriage, and then get divorced again before remarrying her former husband. Polygamy is a practice where Muslim men are allowed to have multiple wives. Shayara Bano argued that these practices violated her fundamental rights as a woman and went against the principles of gender justice and equality enshrined in the Indian Constitution. She contended that the practices were arbitrary, and discriminatory, and left Muslim women vulnerable to abuse and injustice. She also argued that the practices were not essential to the practice of Islam and should be declared unconstitutional.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The case of Shayara Bano vs Union of India was filed in the Supreme Court of India on February 2016. Shayara Bano, the petitioner, challenged the constitutionality of the practice of Triple Talaq, which allows Muslim men to divorce their wives by saying the word “Talaq” three times in one go.

The case was assigned to a five-judge bench of the Supreme Court, which held several rounds of hearings and considered arguments from both sides. The bench was headed by Chief Justice J.S. Khehar and included Justices Kurian Joseph, Rohinton Fali Nariman, Uday Umesh Lalit, and Abdul Nazeer. The first hearing in the case was held on May 11, 2017, and the court directed the Union of India to file its response to the petition. The All India Muslim Personal Law Board (AIMPLB) was also allowed to intervene in the case and present its arguments.

The Union of India, represented by the Attorney General, took a neutral stand on the issue and argued that it was up to the Supreme Court to decide whether Triple Talaq was constitutional or not. The AIMPLB, on the other hand, supported the practice of Triple Talaq and argued that it was a matter of personal law and should be left to the community to decide.

The court held several rounds of hearings over the next few months and heard arguments from both sides. The bench also received submissions from several other Muslim women who had been victims of Triple Talaq and other similar practices.

Finally, on August 22, 2017, the Supreme Court delivered its judgment on the case.

JUDGEMENT AND ANALYSIS

This case is a landmark judgment that has inspired many women to make bold movements and is famously known as the judgment that changed India. This landmark case is also known for its unique diversity in the religion of the judges as it was headed by a Sikh Judge followed by judges from other religions namely, Christianity, Islam, Parsi, and a Hindu judge. In this case, Shayara Bano along with 4 other Muslim women was subjected to talaq e biddat also known as instant triple talaq. They demanded that talaq e biddat should be declared unconstitutional because they believed that it violated their fundamental rights. Hence the five-bench constitution bench mentioned before they were formed. It is also quite ironic that there was no women judge on the bench given the fact that the case dealt with gender justice. The verdict of this case was quite unexpected as the Supreme Court neither constitutionally banned nor legally, instead, they set aside the Muslim Personal law related to triple talaq. 2 out of the 5 judges namely CJI Khehar and Justice Nazeer said this law cannot be banned and the other 2 judges namely justice R.F.Nariman and Justice U.U.Lalit declared it unconstitutional. It was read perhaps for the first time that a Muslim Personal Law is also a fundamental right as the law comes under the religion of Islam and people have the right to practice any religion as a fundamental right. Thus, they said the law must not be banned.

On the other hand, the other two judges declared that the act was arbitrary, that is without any application of logic and also violating the fundamental rights of the women, the law is unconstitutional. They read that the Muslim personal is a pre-constitutional law that is not arbitrary and thus is to be banned. The last judge, Justice Kurian Joseph said that triple talaq is unislamic. He went on to justify his statement by stating that for talaq to occur, there are two prerequisites for the same. Justice Kurian Joseph said that for talaq to be valid, there must be reconciliation and arbitration and that in the form of triple talaq, there is no scope for either as it is irrevocable. Reconciliation and arbitration are two essentials of Islam divorce law where both parties may plan to reunite after marriage. Even though the judges did not declare it unconstitutional, it was sent forth to the parliament for implementation. Eventually, on 28 December 2017, the Lok Sabha passed the bill with a majority. 

The question here is whether the passing of the bill is a violation of the Islamic principle or a stepping stone toward women’s empowerment. 

We can see how patriarchal the laws are as the only way in which Muslim women can get separated from their Muslim husbands is by Talaq-e-Tafweez. The wife can approach the court for the dissolution of the marriage under the Muslim Marriage Act, of 1939 if any of the said conditions are practised by the husband. Moreover, it is like an agreement, they don’t have the option to pronounce talaq in different ways as Muslim men do. When talaq-e-biddat was banned in Shayara Bano v. Union of India., some sort of legal protection was awarded to the Muslim women and this landmark judgment was a ray of hope for them. 

Under the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, Muslim women at the time of divorce can ask their husbands for maintenance only until the Iddat period. If the woman is not in a position to maintain herself and she has not married again, she is not entitled to ask her former husband for maintenance. Its constitutional validity was challenged in the landmark case of Daniel Latifi & Anr., v. Union of India.^[1], where it was argued that the rights of Muslim women are violated under articles 14, 15, and 21 of the constitution. Therefore, it was held that women are to be awarded maintenance under section 125 of CrPC. This section ensured that women in general is protected from destitution and vagrancy and were secular in nature.

These two landmark cases ensured the protection of the rights of women and a better position in society along with giving a wide interpretation of article 44 and the Uniform Civil Code. 

CONCLUSION

Men under Muslim law have the right to marry 4 women at a time whereas women can contractually enter only a single marriage. This clearly shows the patriarchy that women face and their plight when compared to men. In the present world of advanced science, technology, and advanced thinking, where there are different methods that have been developed for the rescue of people like adoption, IVF, etc. the procreation capacity of women cannot be considered a justification for polygamy. In such a scenario, UCC needs a safe and secure future for women in society. This is an important issue in the current scenario because, in many of Islam-practicing countries like Iran, Tunisia, Pakistan, etc. polygamy has already been abolished. It is high time for a country like India which give immense importance to human rights and equality to consider the same.

---

ENDNOTES:

1. Daniel Latifi & Anr., v. Union of India., (2001) 7 SCC 740

This case analysis is done by Vishal Menon, from Symbiosis Law School, Hyderabad.

-Report by Tannu Dahiya

Bombay High Court while hearing the petition on 27th February 2023 in the case Sandeep Arjun Kudale v. State of Maharashtra directed the police to carefully look into the matter and must find whether an offence has been made or not before arresting a person. 

Facts

The facts of the case are as follows:

In Writ petition no. 21880 of 2022

The complainant is a resident of Kothrud, Pune. One fine day while browsing on Twitter, he came across a video which was uploaded by the petitioner on his account wherein he was seen standing in front of the bungalow of Mr Chandrakant Patil, Minister of Higher and Technical Education and Cabinet Minister, Maharashtra State and Palak Mantri (Guardian Minister), making objectionable remark against him which has created disharmony in the communities and has provoked the sentiments of people belonging to Dr. Ambedkar and Phule’s community.Hence he registered an FIR against him alleging offences punishable under Sections 153A(1)(a) and 153A(1)(b) of the IPC, on 11.12.2022.

In the 2nd writ petition no. 21886 of 2022

Here the complainant is a resident of Wajre, Pune. He is an active social worker of the BJP. He mentioned that Mr. Chandrakant Patil mentioned about Dr. Ambedkar and Mahatma Phule in his speech which was misinterpreted by the petitioner.It is alleged that the petitioner by uploading the video had created an negative opinion of the said Minister and had also promoted enmity among the different groups in society. 

Petitioner’s contentions

The petitioner seeks to quash both the FIR against him. 

Mr Desai learned counsel for the petitioner submits that no offence as alleged has been disclosed against the petitioner in both the FIRs. The FIR was made with a political motive and the sole intention was to harass the petitioner who is also a member of the Congress Party. He was also arrested and kept in custody for two days without any justification. He was falsely framed in this case as he questioned one of the sitting cabinet members of the state. By lodging, this complaint his fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression is clearly violated. Hence the learned counsel pleads that both FIRs should be quashed and set aside. He also relied on the judgements made in Manzar Sayeed Khan v. State of Maharashtra & AnrBalwant Singh & Anr. v. State of Punjab, and Bilal Ahmed Kaloo v. State of Andhra Pradesh. 

Respondent’s contentions

Dr Saraf learned Advocate General opposed the petition claiming that the sections have been rightly invoked by the police. He submits that the video posted by the petitioner has created an atmosphere of enmity between different groups in society. He also argues that the Police were correct in every manner to register the FIRs as it is their duty to maintain public peace and tranquillity. 

Judgement

Since the issues involved in both the writ petitions are the same, they are heard together. The court made observations regarding different cases. In the Manzar Sayeed Khan case the Apex court held that it was not only the words of the book which should be for provoking the charge. It is the language of the book which decides its intention. 

In Balwant singh case, held that the appellants have committed an offence under Sections 124A and 153A of the IPC, for raising anti-national slogans after Indra Gandhi’s assassination.  In this case, the Court had accepted that mens rea is an essential ingredient of the offence

under Section 153-A and the spoken or written words must have an intention of creating public disorder for disturbance of law and order or affect public “tranquillity”, in order to commit an offence. Having considered the provision of law, the court held that no offence has been committed in this case and the FIRs are quashed and set aside. 

The reasons stated for this are that the petitioner in the video can be seen just commenting on the speech of the Minister which is clearly his opinion and he has the right to freedom of speech and expression as guaranteed under the Constitution. There is clearly no intention of the petitioner to create public disharmony and disturb the public “tranquillity”. The court asked the police to apply their mind before arresting a person as arrest makes a serious impact on the person as well his family’s reputation and mental health. 

The law cannot be used as a tool to harass people and stop them from expressing their views and raising their voices which the Constitution guarantees them. Hence the petitions are disposed of accordingly. The court also directed the state Government to pay Rs25000/- for the unjustified arrest made within four weeks of the order. 

Citation: C. W. P no. 21880 of 2022
               C. W. P no. 21886 of 2022

-Report by Arun Bhattacharya

The honourable Supreme Court of India on Monday (27^th of February, 2023) while allowing an appeal matter (SIRAJUDHEEN versus ZEENATH & Ors.) observed that “merely because a particular evidence which ought to have been adduced but had not been adduced, the Appellate Court cannot adopt the soft course of remanding the matter.” 

FACTS

The original matter concerned a civil suit filed by one of the sisters who were involved in an agreement regarding their father’s property. The primary cause of action arose because of a fraudulent or coercive sale deed executed between the original plaintiff and the present appellant which as per the former’s claim was signed under the misconception that it was an agreement of a completely different subject matter but later found out to be a sale of her portion or share in the partitioned property. The trial court dismissed the suit while the High Court in the appeal is not satisfied by the evidences and was confused to appropriately provide relief and hence remanded the matter back to the Trial Court for further incorporation of evidences. The respondents in that matter happened to be aggrieved by the same and filed the present appeal before the apex court.

APPELLANT’S CONTENTION

The counsel for the appellants primarily contended the fact that the honourable High Court was just in remanding the matter back to the Trial Court whereby giving the original plaintiffs another opportunity to adduce further evidences. This fact was a point of contention since it was their obligation while filing the initial suit and such ignorance should not be and cannot be made ground for furthering a matter which is already predisposed off. 

RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION

The respondent/ original plaintiff’s counsel tried to convince the apex court of the vitality of the stance of the High Court while remanding the matter. They highlighted the merits of the case that since the document/ sale deed was void, it was appropriate on part of the High Court to provide such an opportunity to the aggrieved parties to submit further documents in favour of supporting the same.

JUDGEMENT

The honourable apex court while pointing out some of the errors committed by the High Court while deciding the aforementioned appeal observed that

“the High Court has not at all referred to the findings of the Trial Court and it is difficult to find from the judgment impugned as to why at all those findings were not to be sustained or the decree was required to be reversed”.

The fundamental factor that the honourable Supreme Court of India emphasised was that the High Court was unable to provide just and proper reasons for remanding the matter back to the Trial Court when the latter had already concluded the same. Thus the lack of particular evidences which was expected by one party to be submitted but was not cannot be a just reason to remand the matter back to a court which had already concluded the matter on the basis of already provided evidences. This was the stance of the apex court while allowing the appeal and setting aside the impugned order of the High Court.

READ FULL JUDGEMENT: https://bit.ly/3KFGFCl

Mahtta & Co. is looking to hire legal associates in Noida & Ludhiana interested in a dynamic role in the field of law with global exposure.

About the Organization

Mahtta and Co. (M&C) is a premier IP-Boutique firm based in India that has forged global relationships and developed international reach through all corners of the world. M&C concentrates exclusively on intellectual property matters. This includes trademark, copyright, patent, industrial design, and litigation service and general advisory on all IP issues.

Preferences

• Well-versed in IP laws
• Experienced in IP Prosecution & Opposition Procedures
• Avid Learner, Good Drafting Skills & Self-motivated
• Strong Skillset with Analytical Approach

PQE

1-2 years

Qualification

Bachelor of Law (LL.B)/ Master of Law (LLM)

Location

Noida & Ludhiana

Remuneration

As per industry standards

Application Procedure

Interested candidates may write to hr@mahttaco.in

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About the Organization

Mandla & Singh Law Chambers is a multi-disciplinary Dispute Resolution, Criminal and Civil Litigation firm with dedicated verticals covering White Collar Crimes, Blue Collar Crimes, Company Laws, Property & Land Laws, and Matrimonial Laws, among other fields.

Internship Period

4 weeks, w.e.f., 01.03.2023

Location

Hauz Khas, South Delhi

Application Procedure

Interested persons, please apply with your CV at internships@mandlaandsinghlaw.com

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Sinha & Company, Advocates are looking for Long Term Interns for their Corporate Law team.

About the Organization

A full-service law firm based out of Kolkata, founded in 1993 by Mr Paritosh Sinha (the Advocate-on-Record for the State of West Bengal).

Eligibility

4th year or 5th year of 5-year integrated law program

Department

Corporate law

Internship Duration

Willing to dedicate 6 -8 months

Mode of Internship

Offline/physical, no provision for online mode

Location

Kolkata

Remuneration

Remuneration negotiable

Application Procedure

Send your CV to career@sinhaco.com with the subject “Long-term internship for corporate law” by 15th March 2023.

Disclaimer: All information posted by us on Lexpeeps is true to our knowledge. But still, it is suggested that you check and confirm things on your level.

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-Report by Eshna Ray

The Constitution of India has been invoked by the petitioners under Article 32 to seek relief regarding the constitution of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi after the elections held on December 4, 2022. The elections were held to elect 250 Councillors, and the first petitioner is a prospective candidate for the post of Mayor. Despite over two months passed since the election, the election of the Mayor has not taken place. The matter is now before the Court, seeking a resolution to this delay in the constitution of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi.

Fact

The Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 is an act that establishes the municipal corporation in Delhi. Chapter II of the Act deals with the establishment of the corporation, and Section 35(1) provides for the election of the chairperson, known as the Mayor. Chapter V of the Act deals with the procedure and transaction of business by the corporation, and Section 72(1) provides for monthly meetings.

The controversy in the case before the court was whether aldermen nominated by the Administrator have the right to vote at the first meeting of the corporation where the Mayor is elected and the order of holding elections. The opposing views were that the aldermen should not have the right to vote, and all elections should be held simultaneously, respectively.

Article 243R of the Indian Constitution deals with municipalities, and Clause (1) stipulates that all seats in a municipality shall be filled by direct election. An exception is provided in Clause (2) of the Article, which allows the legislature of a state to provide for representation in a municipality of persons with special knowledge or experience in municipal administration. The Court heard arguments from both sides and considered the provisions of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957, and Article 243R of the Constitution.

Judgement

In this case, the Court was dealing with the question of the order in which the election of the Mayor, Deputy Mayor, and members of the Standing Committee of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi should be conducted. The Court referred to the relevant provisions of the Constitution and the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957, and also relied on the judgment in Ramesh Mehta v Sanwal Chand Singh (2004) 5 SCC 409.

Article 243R of the Constitution provides for the composition of Municipalities. Clause (1) of the Article provides for direct election to all the seats in a Municipality, subject to exceptions provided in clause (2). Clause (2) contains provisions, inter alia, for the representation in a Municipality of persons having special knowledge or experience in Municipal administration as well as other persons such as members of the House of the People and the Legislative Assembly and members of the Council of States and the Legislative Council of the States representing the specific constituency and the Chairpersons of the Committees constituted under clause (5) of Article 243S. The Constitution has imposed a restriction in terms of which nominated members who are brought in on account of their special knowledge or experience in Municipal administration do not have the right to vote. The same restriction finds statutory recognition in Section 3(3)(b)(i) of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957.

The Court held that the election of the Mayor should be held first, and upon the election of the Mayor, the Mayor shall act as the presiding authority for conducting the election of the Deputy Mayor and the members of the Standing Committee. The Court clarified that the prohibition on the exercise of vote by the nominated members in terms of Section 3(3)(b)(i) shall continue to operate even during the election of the Deputy Mayor and members of the Standing Committee. The Court directed that the notice convening the first meeting of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi should be issued within a period of twenty-four hours and should fix the date for convening the first meeting at which the election of the Mayor, Deputy Mayor, and members of the Standing Committee shall be conducted in terms of the above directions.

The Supreme Court issued directions for the first meeting of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi, which includes holding elections for the Mayor and Deputy Mayor posts, and members of the Standing Committee. Members nominated in Section 3(3)(b)(i) of the Act cannot vote in these elections. The elected Mayor will preside over the elections for Deputy Mayor and Standing Committee members, where the same prohibition on voting by nominated members will apply. The notice for the first meeting must be issued within 24 hours and should include the dates for the elections as per the Court’s directions.

READ FULL JUDGEMENT: https://bit.ly/3xUyvOL