Marathwada Mitra Mandal’s College, Shankarrao Chavan Law College is organizing a 7-day Faculty Development Program on Legal Research Methodology.

ABOUT

Research plays an inevitable role in the development of all disciplines. Research is the systematic activity to ascertain the assumption or to verify the information based on the collected data or evidence. According to Redman and Mary research is ‘systematized efforts to gain knowledge. The methodology is the specific mode or science of a particular subject.

Research Methodology is a scientific and systematized investigation to acquire new knowledge and understanding about the issues or phenomena. Law is interrelated with every discipline. Without the scientific and systematic approach of the legal research methodology, the study and development of the law turn out to be irrelevant and irrational reasoning of law.

ELIGIBILITY

Academicians, Research Scholars, Post Graduate Students, Advocates

IMPORTANT DATES

  • Registration Deadline – October 10, 2022
  • Program Dates – October 16 to 22, 2022

CONTACT DETAILS

mmmsclc@gmail.com

https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLSdGor-_kfLE7XjtzPWb-Tcs4w5BZBmkKjMYtVecGy_N0yqWNg/viewform

Disclaimer: All information posted by us on Lexpeeps is true to our knowledge. But still, it is suggested that you check and confirm things on your level.

WhatsApp Group:

https://chat.whatsapp.com/G4bxdgRGHY8GRzOPSHrVwL

Telegram:

https://t.me/lexpeeps

LinkedIn:

https://www.linkedin.com/company/lexpeeps-in-lexpeeps-pvt-ltd

School of Law, Graphic Era Hill University (GEHU), Dehradun is organizing a five-day Faculty Development Program (FDP) on emerging contours of legal education and teaching techniques from September 19 to 24, 2022.

ABOUT

The five-day faculty development program (FDP) on emerging contours of legal education and teaching techniques, organized by the School of Law, GEHU, is intended to boost the teaching, learning, and research skills of researchers and academicians who are actively engaged with the legal field.

The program aims to provide an opportunity for the participants to learn and gather knowledge on contemporary issues and developments happening in various areas of law globally.

EVENT SCHEDULE

  • Day 1: Inaugural Ceremony: 11 A.M. onwards
    • Session I (11:30 AM-12:30 PM): Monday, September 19, 2022
    • Technical Session on “Issues relating to the Pedagogy of Criminal Law teaching.” By (Prof.) Dr. B.B. Pande, National Law University, Delhi
  • Day 2:
    • Session I (11:00 AM- 12:00 PM) Tuesday, September 20, 2022
    • Technical Session on “Victim discourse in teaching Criminal Procedure Law.” by Mr. Neeraj Tiwari, Assistant Professor, National Law University, Delhi.
    • Session II (2:00 PM -3:00 PM) September 20, 2022
    • Technical Session on “Teaching Techniques to teach Legal Research Methodology” by Dr. Shipra Gupta Associate Professor, Department of Laws, Panjab University, Chandigarh.
  • Day 3:
    • Session I (11:00 AM-12:00 PM) Wednesday, September 21, 2022
    • Technical Session on “Emerging Contours of Business Law: Teaching Techniques and Future Discourse.” by Dr. Avnish Bhatt, Assistant Professor, Xavier Law School, XIM University.
    • Session II (2:00 PM -3:00 PM) Wednesday, September 21, 2022
    • Technical Session on “Emerging Contours of Alternative Dispute Resolution: Teaching Techniques and Future Discourse” by Dr. Neelam Tyagi Assistant Professor, Campus Law Centre, Faculty of Law, University of Delhi.
  • Day 4:
    • Session I (11:00 AM-12:00 PM) Thursday, September 22, 2022
    • Technical Session on “Teaching Techniques to teach Taxation Law.” by Dr. Jasper Vikas Assistant Professor, National Law University, Delhi.
    • Session II (2:00 PM-3:00 PM) Thursday, September 22, 2022
    • Technical Session on “Emerging Contours of Corporate Law: Teaching Techniques and Future Discourse.” by Dr. Ankit Awasthi Assistant Professor, Hidayatullah National Law University, Raipur.
  • Day 5:
    • Session I (11:00 AM-12:00 PM) Friday, September 23, 2022
    • Technical Session on “Teaching Techniques to teach International Human Rights Law.” by Dr. Manoj Kumar Sinha, Professor & Director, Indian Law Institute, Delhi.
    • Session II (2:00 PM-3:00 PM) Friday, September 23, 2022
    • Technical Session on “Interface between Public Law and Intellectual Property Law” by Dr. Uday Shankar Professor & Hon’ble Registrar, Hidayatullah National Law University, Raipur.
  • Day 6: Valedictory Ceremony (11:00 AM Onwards, Saturday, September 24, 2022)
    • Chief Guest, Dr. G.S. Bajpai, Professor & Hon’ble Vice-Chancellor Rajiv Gandhi National University of Law, Punjab.

ELIGIBILITY

The FDP is designed for researcher scholars, academicians and doctoral candidates who are indulged in teaching or conducting research in legal field.

DETAILS

  • Date:  September 19 to 24, 2022
  • Mode: Virtual/Online (Microsoft Teams)
  • E-certificates will be provided to the participants who attend all the sessions.
  • All participants must fill out a registration form linked at the end of this post and submit proof of payment.
  • The registration fee for the faculty development programme is INR 500/-. Fees can be paid through IMPS/NEFT on the details given below.

DEADLINE

September 17, 2022

CONTACT DETAILS

9868027388

https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLSeCfROgQib9b_8aZEZ3tL4Ih3rHHs11fUp-kF_JL-7YS6qiEg/viewform

Disclaimer: All information posted by us on Lexpeeps is true to our knowledge. But still, it is suggested that you check and confirm things on your level.

WhatsApp Group:

https://chat.whatsapp.com/G4bxdgRGHY8GRzOPSHrVwL

Telegram:

https://t.me/lexpeeps

LinkedIn:

https://www.linkedin.com/company/lexpeeps-in-lexpeeps-pvt-ltd

About the Organization

The purpose of establishing the CSL is to investigate and engage in creative idea-generation processes in order to highlight the enormous legal and intellectual potential of the “sports law sector.” The goal of CSL is to give students and young attorneys access to specialists in the disciplines of sports and entertainment law as well as to give them the chance to research and investigate the numerous facets of sports and entertainment law.

About the Responsibilities  

The Center for Sports Law (CSL), UPES is excited to provide the students chances for legal research internships. The Center for Sports and Entertainment Law (CSL) invites students to investigate the legal and academic potential in this area.

Eligibility

  • Law students in their second to fifth year; strong academic standing; a love of writing; preference given to those with a few publications in national or international journals.

Perks

  • Certificate
  • Letter of recommendation
  • Regular training and mentorship on research and writing

Deadline for Applying

September 15, 2022

How to Apply?

Interested candidates may apply from here: –  Send the following documents in PDF format to csl@ddn.upes.ac.in:

– A statement of purpose (within 500 words)

– Updated Resume

– Writing sample (within 1000 words)

Disclaimer: All information posted by us on Lexpeeps is true to our knowledge. But still, it is suggested that you check and confirm things on your level.

For regular updates, we can catchup at-

WhatsApp Group:

https://chat.whatsapp.com/G4bxdgRGHY8GRzOPSHrVwL

Telegram:

https://t.me/lexpeeps

LinkedIn:

https://www.linkedin.com/company/lexpeeps-in-lexpeeps-pvt-ltd

-Report by Kshitiz Bhushan

It has been held by a bench of the Hon’ble Delhi High Court consisting of Justice Dinesh Kumar Sharma in the case of M/S Deutsche Lufthansa AG vs. Manisha Thakur & Ors. that while adjudicating the reference filed under Section 33 of the ID Act, the CGIT is bound to examine the justness and proper enquiry conducted against the workman.

The petitioner has challenged the order dated 08th August 2022 passed by the learned Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court-II (CGIT) in Case No.119 of 2021 whereby the learned CGIT has rejected the contention of the petitioner for framing two additional issues

(i) Whether the claimant is a workman or not as defined under the ID Act
(ii) Whether a just and proper enquiry was conducted against the complainant or not. The court ordered the CGIT to examine and adjudicate the issue as to the justness of the enquiry as well whether enquiry has been conducted in accordance with the law and the principles of natural justice

An ID was pending before the learned tribunal regarding service conditions and other matters. While it was pending the respondent-workman was terminated from service by petitioner management after conducting an enquiry according to the principles of natural justice. The respondents have claimed that the application has been filed only to delay the proceedings.

The court held that whether the respondent-workman falls within the ambit of the definition of “workman” comes within the discussion of the first issue. The court pointed out that the CGIT had observed that the scope of section 33 of the Industrial Dispute Act is not to adjudicate the correctness of the action taken or the fairness of domestic enquiry conducted. The court then relied on the case of Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation (supra) and held that

“while adjudicating the reference filed under Section 33 of the ID Act, the CGIT is bound to examine the justness and proper enquiry conducted against the workman.”

The court modified the order and held that the correctness of the enquiry shall also be added as an issue and the tribunal examine and adjudicate the same.

-Report by Prerna Gaur

The honorable High Court of Delhi held in the case of STAR INDIA PVT. LTD. & ANR. versus AAPKEAAJANESE.NET & ORS “rogue websites” that rogue websites were guilty of copyright infringement under Section 51 of the Act and were not entitled to exemptions under 52 (1)(c) of the Act or Section 79 of Information Technology Act, 2000.

FACTS

There is a contention on the behalf of the plaintiff that the defendants are stealing their original content and making it available on their websites which are prohibited under the Copyright Act of 1976 as well as the IT Act. Therefore, the plaintiff is praying for a permanent injunction as well as claiming damages of Rs 2,00,01,000/-. Plaintiff no 1. is a leading entertainment and media Company in India. It is the owner of various television channels and with due permission from Ministry and Broadcasting has exclusive rights to broadcast 64 channels in 8 languages. Plaintiff no.2 is the wholly owned subsidiary of Plaintiff no.1 and is the owner of the digital platform HOTSTAR.

PLAINTIFF’S CONTENTION

These websites are infringing the copyrights of Star India Limited. Plaintiff had asked the honorable court to put down the content from the website and the plaintiff also asked for compensation for the same. It was alleged by the plaintiff that there was illegal and unauthorized distribution, broadcasting, rebroadcasting, transmission and streaming of the plaintiff’s original content by the rogue websites. There were no traceable details of either the registrant or the user of the website. Although legal notices were sent to the defendants, however, there was no response by the defendants. The defendants have not filed any written statements.

Court’s Judgements

The court held that the concerned websites were guilty of copyright infringement under Section 51 of the Act and were not entitled to exemptions under 52 (1)(c) of the Act or Section 79 of the Information Technology Act, 2000. As far as “rogue websites” are concerned, the Court identified the following illustrative factors to be considered in determining whether a particular website falls within that class. It was observed

“b. The details of the registrants of each of the websites are masked and no personal or traceable details are available either of the registrant or the user.
c. Despite receipt of legal notices, the Defendants nos. 1 to 67 have not complied with the requests to take down the infringing content.
d. The Defendants nos. 1 to 67 contain directories or indexes to facilitate infringement of copyright.
e. The copyrighted content is available illegally on the websites of the Defendant nos. 1 to 67 and the same is evidenced by the screenshots placed at pages 297 to 1364 of Volume II-VII of the documents filed by the plaintiffs along with the Plaint.”

In light of the above observations, the court held that the plaintiffs are entitled to the relief claimed.

-Report by Reyanshi Bansal

It has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Independent School Federation v. Union of India that teachers are to be included in the definition of employee and the legal flaw of excluding them from being paid gratuity is to be terminated.

The Payment Gratuity Act, 1972, gave rights to those employees who rendered continuous service for at least five years to be paid gratuity on their retirement due to death or disability due to accident or disease. However, the definition of “employee” was restrictive in such a manner that it excluded private school teachers from receiving such payment.
This definition was rectified after the case of Ahmedabad Private Primary Teachers’ Association v. Administrative Officer via the Payment of Gratuity (Amendment) Bill, 2007 to involve teachers even though the court held that teachers were not “employees” under the Act. The constitutional validity of this amendment was challenged by several private schools.

The petitioners contended that the legislation overrules the judicial decision and goes against the doctrine of separation of powers. Furthermore, they found the amendment unreasonable, excessive and harsh, therefore, unconstitutional. Another argument was that it would be tyrannous and autocratic to make the private institutions liable for payment of gratuity for service before 1997. One of the submissions stated that the amendment should
only be valid if the Government refunds the taxes paid. Finally, the private schools and writ petitioners insisted on the enactment of the Repealing and Amending Act, 2016 by which the Amendment Act 2009 was repealed.

In response to the first ground, the court observes that the legislature can amend the language of a certain provision that was the subject matter of a court decision, and the court (in the case of Ahmedabad Private Primary Teachers’ Association) acknowledged that cognization of the situation of teachers in various establishments where gratuity is not available should be taken by the legislature.

The claim that the amendment is unconstitutional lacks merit and substance. Due to an error in law, teachers were unavailable to get access to rightly deserved gratuity whereas all other employees in the private school were. The purpose of the amendment was to remove such a technical flaw and give effect to what was intended by the Payment of Gratuity Act.

The gratuity is not despotic as argued because the employees are entitled to a gratuity if the conditions of the Act are met and there is an upper cap limit so it can be computed reasonably. This is a right accrued by the teachers and not giving them so, would be unjust. Moreover, the legislature is not confined to the tax statutes thereby making the penultimate argument unfounded and irrational. Onto the last contention of the Repealing Act, section 4 of the act directs that the repealing will not affect the validity, effect or consequence of any liability that has already been incurred. The court held that-

“The private schools would make payment to the employees/teachers along with the interest in accordance with the provisions of the Payment of Gratuity Act within a period of 6 weeks from today and in case of default, the employees/teachers may move the appropriate forum to enforce payment in accordance with the provisions of the Payment of Gratuity Act. In the facts of the case, there will be no orders as to costs.”

For the above-mentioned reasons, the court quashed the writ petitions and the transfer case and aforesaid appeals were dismissed. It was also reaffirmed that the purpose of the legislature was to give retrospective effect to the amendment made in the Payments of Gratuity Act,1972.

-Report by Harshita

The matter of determining the arbitration fee was discussed in detail in the case of ONGC v. Afcons Gunanusa JV.

In May 2009, Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Limited(ONGC) and Afcons Gunanusa entered into a contract for the construction of an ICP-R Platform. The Platform was completed in October 2012. Due to some disparities between the parties, Afcons invoked arbitration in the case in July 2015. In August of the same year, ONGC appointed Justice Gyan Sudha Mishra as their arbitrator with Afcons appointing Justice Mukul Mudgal. Both the arbitrators appointed Justice GN Ray as the guiding arbitrator. In a preliminary meeting of the tribunal in November 2015, the members agreed that the fee schedule for the arbitration fee suggested in the contract was impractical. ONGC was not agreeing to the revision in the schedule whilst the arbitrators and Afcons agreed. In a letter to ONGC by the council, it was suggested to revise the fee schedule according to the fourth schedule of the Arbitration and Conciliation act 1996. The fee given was Rs. 30 lakhs for cases above the jurisdiction of Rs. 20 crores which were Rs. 900 crores here. Again, the tribunal informed ONGC on the matter that they would no longer bargain for this amount if ONGC would agree to the amount in the fourth schedule and also provide a reading fee of Rs. 6 lakhs each. ONGC could not agree on providing a reading fee. In August 2016, The tribunal fixed a fee of Rs 1.5 lakhs for every arbitrator for sitting for three hours. Thus, after not agreeing to the set arbitration fee, ONGC filed a petition in the Bombay High Court u/s 14 and 15 of the Arbitration Act. They filed for a termination of the current tribunal and a substitution. In October 2021, the Bombay High Court bailed out of the case claiming that it doesn’t fall under their jurisdiction as the tribunal was on an international level. That is when ONGC filed for a new arbitration petition.

While ONGC argued, with a letter in August 2020, let the arbitration tribunal know that the executives of the institute did not approve of the change in fees. They stood by the same throughout the situation. The respondents contended that the tribunal wanted to fix the correct amount of fees and suggested following the fourth schedule of the Arbitration Act, also an exclusive reading fee for the sessions was requested.

COURT’S DECISION

A fee schedule was already prescribed in the LSTK contract, which was rejected by the tribunal in a preliminary meeting. And the tribunal by itself decided on the fee of Rs. 1.5 lakh for a 3-hour sitting at the end. It was observed

“In view of our directives in Section C.2.4, we exercise our powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India and direct the constitution of a new arbitral tribunal in accordance with the arbitration agreement. For this purpose, Arbitration Petition (C) No. 5 of 2022 would be listed for directions before this Court on 21 September 2022. The above directions should not be construed as a finding on the conduct of the arbitration proceedings. These directions are an attempt to ensure that the arbitral proceedings are conducted without rancour which may derail the proceedings. In consonance with our findings, the fee payable to the earlier arbitral tribunal PART G 135 would be the fee payable in terms of the Fourth Schedule of the Arbitration Act. Though the Fourth Schedule is per se not applicable to an international commercial arbitration, since ONGC had indicated (following the suggestion of the arbitral tribunal) that it would be agreeable to pay the fee payable in terms of Schedule, it cannot now take recourse to the arbitration agreement between the parties to pay a lesser fee. We further clarify that if the fee in excess of the amount payable under the Fourth Schedule has been paid to the members of the arbitral tribunal, such amount will not be recovered from them.”

The court took a look at the comparison of India’s situation in this matter and the international views. India lacks jurisdiction on the matter of arbitration fees. Usually, when a tribunal is constituted, the fee is determined by the institution or discussed with and finalized by the presiding arbitrator. The parties are not a part of such discussions but in ad hoc arbitrations the parties can discuss such fees with the members of the tribunal on their own. The issues that arose in these cases have been concluded by giving the following decisions:

● Arbitrators cannot be the sole judges in the determination of the arbitration fees. They cannot issue any binding orders on this matter. Even though they have the power to apportion the cost between the parties u/s 31(8) and 31A of the Arbitration Act.
● It has been held that the arbitration fee should be fixed at the establishment for the avoidance of matters arising including conflicts between the parties and arbitrators.
● The terms of the fourth schedule refer to claim and counterclaim differently. Thus, arbitrators can charge fees in both situations in an ad hoc case and the ceiling will be applied to both the claim and counterclaim fee.
● The price ceiling given as Rs. 30 lakhs applies to the sum of Rs. 19,87,500 and the variable amount. The highest fee is to be Rs. 30 lakhs.
● The fee applies to each arbitrator on the bench and not the tribunal as a whole. Although, a sole arbitrator is to be paid 25 percent above this amount.

-Report by Ojas Bhatnagar

The Delhi High Court has restrained a Ghaziabad-based pizza outlet called ‘Dominick Pizza’ for inflicting trademark infringement by naming it after commercial giant ‘Dominos pizza’. This was held in the case of DOMINOS IP HOLDER LLC & ANR. vs MS DOMINICK PIZZA & ANR.

FACTS

A pizza outlet by the name of “Dominick Pizza” in Ghaziabad has been seriously tarnishing the image of Domino’s Pizza by using a very similar name and logo. The menu of the Dominick pizza is also quite similar to the original Dominos Pizza, by bringing in various pizza variants like “Cheese Burst” and “Pasta Italiano”. This was seen as a grave violation of trademark rules. Dominos Pizza had filed a suit to the High Court seeking an injunction and claiming damages.

Plaintiff’s Contention

There is a clear violation of infringement of the trademark. The plaintiff seeks the court’s injunction in infringement, rendition of accounts, damages and other things. They seek the protection of the mark “Dominos Pizza” and the accompanying device mark, logo mark and also the marks of pizza variants named ‘Cheese Burst’ and ‘Pasta Italiano’. These are all registered trademarks by the plaintiff, and they cannot be used by anyone else. Mr. Tom Monaghan and his brother James Monaghan had bought a pizza store by the name ‘DomiNicks Pizza’ and that is how Domino’s began. They have expanded to over 90 countries, with almost 20,000 stores operating worldwide. They have defended the ‘Dominos Pizza’ trademark in several suits and the decrees have been in their favor. The customers have been confused which is diluting the business of the plaintiff.

The defendants did not appear.

Court’s Order

After hearing the contentions of the petitioners it is clear to the court that the competing marks are deceptive and imitative of each other. The defendant has also falsely listed itself on various social media platforms and online food delivery platforms like Zomato and Swiggy. Even online reviews by various customers show that their business was confused as being similar to Dominos. This confusion has led to the tarnishment of the image of Domino’s Pizza because the reviews on Google are negative. Irreparable injury would be caused if the injunction is not granted.

It was observed:

“Accordingly, as per the facts and circumstances of this matter, the Plaintiffs have made out a prima facie case in their favour for grant of an ex-parte ad interim injunction. The balance of convenience lies in favour of the Plaintiffs, and irreparable injury would be caused if the injunction is not granted…Accordingly, the Defendant No.1, its proprietors, partners, directors, officers, servants, agents, franchisers and all others acting for and on its behalf, are restrained from advertising, selling, offering for sale, marketing etc. any product, packaging, menu cards and advertising material, labels, stationery articles, website or any other documentation using, depicting, displaying in any manner whatsoever, the impugned marks ‘Dominick Pizza’, ‘Cheese Burst’ and ‘Pasta Italiano’ or any other marks or devices/logos which are identical or confusingly/deceptively similar to the Plaintiff’s registered trademarks, till the next date of hearing.”

Interim relief was granted to the plaintiff and the domains and websites of the defendants were also blocked.

-Report by Vedanti Wanjari

It was held by the Supreme Court of India in the case of MAHADEO & ORS V. SMT. SOVAN DEVI & ORS. that the writ petition submitted by the writ petitioner is wholly misconceived and malicious. It is completely unjustified for the High Court to have handled the case under the pretext of helping a disabled ex-serviceman.

FACTS

The judgment made by the learned Single Judge on November 13, 2018, was confirmed in a judgment by the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan on April 19, 2021, which was challenged in an appeal filed before the Supreme Court. In 1965, during the Indo-Pak war, Shri Bheru Lal was a Sepoy in the Indian Army who was injured and amputated his right foot. Thereafter, he was invalidated from service.

The Rajasthan Special Assistance to Disabled Ex-Servicemen and Dependants of Deceased Defence Personnel Act has been established by the State. According to Rule 2(a) of the aforementioned Rules, Shri Bheru qualified as a serviceman with a disability. Rule 6 considered allocating up to 25 Bighas of irrigated land or 50 a large amount of unirrigated land. The idea behind Rule 3 was that these Rules would only apply to government lands in the Bhakra and Chambal Rajasthan Canal Project Colonies, or, if not yet reserved, designated by official notice in the newspaper for distribution to veterans with disabilities.

Additionally, Rule 7 considered the terms and restrictions on allocation. Sub Rule 4 was inserted on 16th February 1967 in Rule 7 wherein it was stated that the allotment will be ruled void and the land will become the property of the state if the allottee does not take possession of the land within six months of the date of allotment. Afterwards, it will be available for re-allocation to anyone else based on these Rules.

Shri Bheru Lal apparently requested a land allocation for disabled military members. The District Collector received a letter from the Soldier Welfare Section of the State’s Revenue Department, On Wednesday, March 19, 1997, word spread that it had been agreed to assign 25 Bighas to Rohikhera Village. There is no letter of land allocation provided to the writ petitioner’s husband or the writ petitioner on file. This letter was internal communication between the departments and not a message for the injured soldier.

Bheru Lal died on July 17, 1998. Sovan Devi,  his wife, succeeded in his inheritance. She appears to be employed by Director General, NCC, at their main office. On January 12, 2010, the writ petitioner presented a representation while at work in the DGNCC headquarters stating that neither she nor her husband had been given control of the land. The High Court passed various orders to ensure possession of the land given to her. The learned Single Judge found
that the alternative land offered to the writ petitioner is located in a very remote/far-off area and is not 6 cultivable and therefore, a direction was issued to give possession of the land originally allotted to the writ petitioner.

APPELLANT’S CONTENTION

On September 27, 2021, the appellants brought a civil lawsuit before the Court of Senior Civil Judge, Vallabhanagar, and this is when they learned for the first time about the order issued by the High Court. The writ petitioner was granted land by the High Court, and the appellants sought this Court to contest the High Court’s decision, which went out of its way to order the seizure of land. A letter of allocation was not provided in favor of the petitioner. Inter-departmental communications are firmly established as being essential to the process of deliberation for wise decision-making that cannot be trusted on which to base any claim of entitlement.

COURT’S DECISION

The court observed that the regulations mention that the allocation will expire if possession is not taken within six months. Further, the interdepartmental process is not to be regarded as a letter of allotment. The hon’ble court relied on a lot of cases and it was observed:

“The question, therefore, is whether he did in fact makesuch an order. Merely writing something on the file doesnot amount to an order. Before something amounts to anorder of the State Government two things are necessary.The order has to be expressed in the name of theGovernor as required by clause (1) of Article 166 andthen it has to be communicated. As already indicated, noformal order modifying the decision of the RevenueSecretary was ever made. Until such an order is drawnup the State Government cannot, in our opinion, beregarded as bound by what was stated in the file………...The manner in whichthe matter has been dealt with by the High Court under the guise ofhelp to disabled ex-serviceman is wholly unwarranted”

Even if it is considered to be a letter of allotment, the writ petitioner cannot ask for possession based on such communication after more than 30 years. The writ petition seems to be misconceived and mischievous. Hence the appeal was allowed and the order of the high court was set aside.

Background

The Constitution has been modified multiple times in order to keep up with societal changes. The Constitution was written to build an equitable society in which social, economic, and political justice are preserved, as well as equality of position and opportunity for all. Amendments to the Constitution are also made with the same goal and intent in mind. According to India’s legal history, anytime the Supreme Court issued a ruling on reservations, the Parliament would either reject or restrain the uncomfortable judicial declaration by amending the Constitution. One such example is the ratification of the Constitution (One Hundred and Third Amendment) Act, 2019, which aimed to grant reservations to economically disadvantaged parts of society.

The Constitution Amendment Act of 2019 amended Articles 15 and 16 of the Indian Constitution. These two clauses provide the foundation of reservation in sectors like education and government employment. The legislation enabled the state to grant a maximum of 10% reserve for “economically weaker parts” of society by inserting two additional articles into Articles 15 and 16 of the Constitution. As a consequence, the total number of reservations over and above the existing programme has risen to 59.50 percent.

Need for the 103rd Amendment

  1. This specific amendment will deal with a problem that is prevalent in India, which is the upper caste pupils who were unable to attend public employment and further education owing to improper family financial structure.
  2. Also, many of the upper caste residents live in poverty and starvation.
  3. The higher caste poor will be able to receive the same level of quota as OBC thanks to this adjustment to the reservation policy.
  4. The upper caste used to despise people who entered the country through reservations, but this amendment will help to end that practice.

What were the Amendments and the Additions?

  1. The Amendment added clauses 15(6) and 16(6) to the corresponding provisions of Articles 15 and 16 of the Constitution, respectively.
  2. The amendment gave the state the power to pass legislation aimed at “advancing any economically disadvantaged portion of citizens other than the classes indicated (in the preceding provisions).”
  3. Article 15(6)(b) specifically mentions “admission to educational institutions including private educational institutions, whether aided or unaided by the State, other than the minority educational institutions referred to in clause (1) of article 30. Article 15(6)(a) discusses allowing the enactment of special provisions of any kind.
  4. EWS reservations are required per Article 16.6 in situations involving “appointments or postings.
  5. The Act specifies a 10% cap on this reserve as its maximum.

The requirement for amending Constitutional clauses

For social and economic advancement, the Constitution is modified. In the case of Keshavanada Bharati v. The State of Kerala (1973), it was noted that the people would turn to extra-constitutional tactics, such as a revolution, to modify the Constitution if no provisions were created for its amendment. Politicians have characterized the federal constitution as stiff because of the way amendments are made in federations. The American Constitution’s amending process is exceedingly challenging. The federal Constitution is frequently criticized for being overly conservative and for being too difficult to change.

The Indian Constitution was therefore drafted in a way that would allow it to adjust to the shifting needs and circumstances of an expanding people in order to avoid becoming inflexible. However, the framers did not want to make the Constitution overly pliable since it would have allowed the ruling party to play to its whims and fancies. The Constitution may be changed since it is neither too strict nor too flexible. According to Willis, there would always be a risk of revolution if no provisions for the amendment were made to the United States Constitutional Law. The risk of taking action that is too quickly would always exist if the technique of the modification were too simple. Our political institutions would be at risk of being overthrown in any scenario.

Therefore, the goal behind altering the Constitution under Article 368 was to bring about societal transformation. The Constitution’s amendment process functions as a safety valve designed to maintain the document’s provisions and to allow for amendments if needed. The risk of having a non-amendable Constitution and the risk of a Constitution that is too easily amendable have therefore been balanced by the constitution-makers.

The challenge to the Constitution’s validity

The Constitution’s “Identity” is formed by certain structural concepts, which include federalism, equality, freedom, secularism, independence of the judiciary, power of judicial review, democratic form of government, republican form of government, and others. The basic structural theory established this, thus it cannot be changed without destroying the constitution’s unique character. The Supreme Court ruled in the precedent-setting case of Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala that the Parliament’s ability to amend the Constitution under Article 368 is not absolute and that even a Constitutional amendment can be invalidated if it has the result of destroying or repealing the “basic structure” of the Constitution.

A government office memo from the P.V. Narasimha Rao administration in September 1991 set aside 10% of positions for “other economically deprived categories.” In Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, the Supreme Court overturned this judgment. The court examined the legality of the quotas in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India and Ors., carefully analyzing the idea of backwardness. As per, Dr. BR Ambedkar, the classes of people for whom reservations were to be introduced are those “communities who have not had thus far representation in the State.” Indra Sawhney, where it was believed that the Constitution allowed for “appropriate representation” rather than “proportionate representation,” explains one of the reasons why the quota limit was set at 50%.

The following is a list of some of the crucial decisions made in the Indra Sawhney case regarding reservations:

  • It upheld the 27% OBC reservation with the condition that the “creamy layer” excluded.
  • It declared that a backward class of citizens cannot be established solely and exclusively with regard to economic backward criteria and nullified the 10% quota for economically backward portions.
  • It was decided that the reservations made for backlog or carried-forward vacancies were valid; should not exceed 50% of the annual appointments
  • It was decided that reservations may only be issued for a service or category if the State was satisfied that the representation of people from the underprivileged class was insufficient.

Does the action contradict the Constitution’s basic structure doctrine?

Youth for Equality, a non-profit organization, filed a Public Interest Litigation with the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution, alleging that the legislation’s decision to grant a ten percent reservation to students from economically disadvantaged groups in public and private educational institutions violates the fundamental principles of the Constitution and supersedes earlier rulings.

The question that emerges initially is that can the basic rights be amended? This can be explained by the 1951 case of Shankari Prasad v. Union of India, in which the constitutionality of the First Amendment Act of 1951, which included Articles 31 A and 31 B, was contested. The argument against the Amendment was that it violates the rights granted by Part III, which is prohibited under Article 13(2) and is therefore invalid. It was argued that because Parliament is included in the definition of “state” in Article 12, the term “Law” in Article 13(2) must also refer to a constitutional amendment.

The next issue is whether the Constitution’s fundamental principles are violated by the Act. The solution may be found by first defining the idea of the fundamental structure before concluding. Although the courts have made various rulings in this regard, they have not defined the idea of the Constitution’s fundamental structure. The idea was debated in the well-known Kesavananda Bharati Case, in which the petitioners actually contested the legitimacy and scope of Article 368, arguing that it lacked any restrictions and so ran counter to the fundamental principles of the constitution.

Critical evaluation

The Indian Constitution establishes an “equality code” to address historical injustices and the obvious inequality in higher education and state jobs. Everyone is guaranteed equal protection under the law and equality before the law under Article 14.

In M.R. Balaji v. State of Mysore, the Supreme Court declared that the reservation should not exceed 50% and overturned the 68% restriction imposed by Article 15 (4) on admissions to medical and engineering institutes in the (then) State of Mysore. According to the rationale behind the “50% ceiling” for reservations in the M.R. Balaji case, the exception cannot supersede the rule. There is nothing to prevent the State from exceeding the “50% ceiling” for reservations if Article 16(4) does not constitute an exception to Article 16(1), provided that the total population of the underrepresented classes is not itself less than 50%. In India, nevertheless, this is not the case.

However, the Supreme Court determined in State of Kerala v. N.M. Thomas that Article 16(1), which is a component of the equality theory, allows for the reasonable classification of all people who are in a comparable situation with regard to a statute identical to Article 14[11]. In other words, even without Article 16(4) of the Indian Constitution, Article 16(1) itself enables reserves and preferential treatment.

In other words, even without Article 16(4) of the Indian Constitution, Article 16(1) itself enables reserves and preferential treatment. Article 16(4) only seeks to make explicit what is already implicit in Article 16 and does not seek to be an exception to Article 16(1). (1). The alternative argument, on the other hand, contends that Articles 15(4) and 16(4), which allow for racial and ethnic minorities in public employment and education, are “exceptions” to Articles 15(1) and 16(1)’s provisions for equality and non-discrimination, and that therefore, exceeding the “50 per ceiling” constitutes reverse discrimination. Indra Sawhney’s decision by the Supreme Court, in essence, constitutes a compromise between M.R. N.M. and Balaji Thomas. It established a compromise between nominal equality and substantive equality by reinstating the “50% ceiling” norm.

Conclusion

The Constitution has been amended and introduced in order to stay up with societal advancements. In order to assure economic upliftment for the populace and to offer benefits to those who experience unemployment and are unable to pay for their school costs, the Constitutional Amendment Act, 2019 has also been proposed and passed. The other fundamental rights and other Constitutional provisions are not in any manner at odds with the Act. It may be said that by revising the Act, the government has given all people equal rights and benefits in terms of economic advancement and has in reality acceded to the Constitution of India’s requirements.


Citations

  1. The Gazette of India.
  2. Indian Constitution, art. 15.
  3. Indian Constitution, art. 16.
  4. Kesavananda Bharati vs State Of Kerala And Anr , 1973.
  5. The Constitution of the United States: A Transcription | National Archives. (2015, November 4). National Archives. https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs/constitution-transcript
  6. Indian Constitution, art. 368.
  7. Indra Sawhney Etc. vs Union Of India And Others, Etc., 1992.
  8. Sri Sankari Prasad Singh Deo vs Union Of India And State Of Bihar, 1951.
  9. M. R. Balaji And Others vs State Of Mysore, 1962.
  10. State Of Kerala & Anr vs N. M. Thomas & Ors, 1975.

This article is written by Puneet Kaur, a second-year student.